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Weber: Against Discourse

AGAINST DISCOURSE: WHY ELIMINATING
RACIAL DISPARITIES REQUIRES RADICAL
POLITICS, NOT MORE DISCUSSION
Robert F. Weber
ABSTRACT
Racial disparity discourse is one of the main modalities through
which we discuss and experience race and racism in the United
States today—in discussions with colleagues and friends, in scholarly
work, on cable news, on social media, and in lecture halls. Despite
its ubiquity, racial disparity discourse is under-theorized: what,
exactly, is its intended purpose? This Essay argues that most
discussion about racial disparities is predicated on the faulty
premise—grounded in the Habermasian concepts of discourse and
communicative rationality—that antiracists will convince their
interlocutors by engaging in a practice of rationalistic discourse
among participants who share the objective and expectation of
consensus. Drawing on the work of political philosopher Charles
Mills and sociologists Pierre Bourdieu and Moon-Kie Jung, the
Essay explains why the pragmatic conditions of possibility for
discourse of this sort concerning matters related to race in the
United States are frequently absent.
Specifically, Mills theorizes that a “racial contract,” saturated
with racialized hierarchies and subordinating logics, has always
underwritten the American social contract, leaving in its wake an
“epistemology of ignorance” that is today responsible for localized
and global cognitive dysfunctions. Jung develops Bourdieu’s concept
of doxa to explain how, when it comes to the politics of race in the
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United States, individual agency and actions are always mediated by
a classificatory, schematic, and hierarchical social structure in
which race frequently plays a decisive organizing role. This Essay
concludes by recommending that those committed to redressing
vulnerability, precarity, and disposability along racialized lines
should not focus their efforts on cobbling together a transracial
coalition of the discursively convinced. Instead, it is argued that
attentional and financial resources are better directed to develop and
reinvigorate a radical, oppositional politics dedicated to eradicating
racialized hierarchies and those elements of the political economy
that reciprocally nurture and feed off them. Political theorist Chantal
Mouffe’s model of “agonistic pluralism,” which centers the
irreducibly conflictual nature of modern politics and proposes a
politics that aims to confront and convert rather than to convince, is
offered as a fruitful theoretical model to underwrite this
non-discursive, radical politics.
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Two considerations . . . broke in upon my work and
eventually disrupted it: first, one could not be a calm, cool,
and detached scientist while Negroes were lynched,
murdered and starved; and secondly, there was no such
definite demand for scientific work of the sort that I was
doing, as I had confidently assumed would be easily
forthcoming. I regarded it as axiomatic that the world
wanted to learn the truth and if the truth was sought with
even approximate accuracy and painstaking devotion, the
world would gladly support the effort. This was, of course,
but a young man’s idealism, not by any means false, but
also never universally true.1
I began to realize that I had overworked a theory—that the
cause of the problems was the ignorance of people; that the
cure wasn’t simply telling people the truth, it was inducing
them to act on the truth. . . . It wasn’t enough, in other
words, simply to study the Negro problem and put the truth
before people. . . . [Y]ou’ve got to do something about it.2
W.E.B. Du Bois
INTRODUCTION

The organizing theme of the Georgia State University Law
Review’s 2021 Symposium asked, “What’s Next for Social Justice

1. W.E.B. DU BOIS, DUSK OF DAWN: AN ESSAY TOWARD AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF A RACE
CONCEPT 34–35 (Oxford Univ. Press 2007) (1940).
2. COLUM. U. ORAL HISTORY PROJECT, REMINISCENCES OF W.E.B. DU BOIS 146–47 (1960) (on
file with the Georgia State University Law Review) (emphasis added). In both of these epigraph
remarks, Du Bois is reminiscing on the jarring experience of having prepared an objective and
contextual summary of a violent episode involving a Black man named Sam Hose accused of rape and
murder for the city’s most important newspaper, only to discover, while walking his manuscript to the
newspaper headquarters, that Hose had already been lynched and that his knuckles were on display in a
butcher shop on the very street Du Bois was walking. See id. at 147–49; DU BOIS, supra note 1, at 34.
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and Racial Equality?”3 This question has an august pedigree when it
comes to America and race; it was on the forefront of Dr. Martin
Luther King Jr.’s mind in 1967, the year before his assassination:
Where Do We Go from Here?, read the title of his final book.4
Following the convulsive protests in the Summer of 2020, the
importance of the question requires no further elaboration. What does
require some reflection, though, is what the terms of the discussion
should be. For instance, social justice and racial equality refer to
distinct political objectives that are intrinsically interrelated, but in
complicated ways. Further, the concept of racial justice straddles
both social justice and racial equality, but is also easily
distinguishable from both.
Projecting the future trajectories of these concepts, as well as the
future experiences of the real people whose material conditions will
answer the Symposium’s question, requires us to wrestle with the
categories of race, class, justice, equality, and political strategy. For
progressive legal scholars, the need to settle some of these
interpretive questions is especially pressing. Law can be a
problematic category in the context of race and class,5 and it might
distract us from being able to provide real assistance to those
engaged in organizing and other political work. We need to conceive
of the role of law and legal reform in responding to racial and
economic injustice as downstream of politics. In other words,
lawyers who are committed to antiracist politics need to specify a
racial politics before making the case for legal reform. Still, lawyers
3. Symposium, GA. ST. U. L. REV, https://gsulawreview.org/pages/143-symposium
[https://perma.cc/R6YX-C39H].
4. See generally MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE: CHAOS OR
COMMUNITY? (1967).
5. See, e.g., Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness As Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1707, 1714 (1993) (“After
legalized segregation was overturned, whiteness as property evolved into a more modern form through
the law’s ratification of the settled expectations of relative white privilege as a legitimate and natural
baseline.”); Robert W. Gordon, Some Critical Theories of Law and Their Critics, in THE POLITICS OF
LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 641, 652 (David Kairys ed., 3d ed. 1998) (“Legal ideology provides
false legitimation when it conceals the violent, coercive, arbitrary, and ugly faces of existing institutions.
It reinforces false necessity by suppressing the alternative arrangements, the more democratic,
egalitarian, cooperative, liberating alternatives, that our legal norms and practices also make
available . . . .”).
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and legal theory play a pivotal role in constructing and navigating the
institutions within which any such politics takes shape—in fostering
the development of what Roberto Unger calls the “institutional
imagination” of society, the sense for what practical institutional
alternatives are possible.6 Lawyers objecting to the continued
salience of race in the distribution of social resources, chances, and
vulnerabilities should pick our partners judiciously.
One task that will help us begin to understand the sociopolitical
significance of the present moment is to parse and map the
deployment of racial disparities data in political discourse. The
experience of Black Americans has often been articulated in the
language of disparity, reflecting the reality that one of the bedrock
features of American history has been the absolute and relative
immiseration of the subset of the population ascriptively denoted as
Black.7 For instance, W.E.B. Du Bois wrote in 1903 that “[t]o be a
poor man is hard, but to be a poor race in a land of dollars is the very
bottom of hardships.”8 A half-century later, Dr. King echoed the
same sentiment: “Poverty is a glaring, notorious reality . . . . [I]t is
poverty amid plenty. It is poverty in the midst of an affluent society,
and I think this is what makes for great frustration and great despair
in the black community and the poor community of our nation
generally.”9 And the sentiment is hardly limited to the economic
realm of income and wealth in Du Bois’s “land of dollars.”10 In a

6. See ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, THE CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES MOVEMENT: ANOTHER
TIME, A GREATER TASK 29–31 (2015); cf. Jack Balkin, Critical Legal Theory Today, in ON
PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICAN LAW 64, 67 (Francis J. Mootz III ed., 2009) (arguing that even though law
can “disguise, mystify, and legitimate great injustices,” it can also help us to create new “discursive and
institutional tools to talk back to power” and to imagine “finer, better visions of human association”).
7. Throughout this Essay, I adopt the convention to capitalize the terms “White” and “Black” to
refer to people ascriptively assigned to those categories, as well as to the cultures and histories
developed around those categories to which those terms also descriptively refer. I do so with
ambivalence, both appreciative of the recognition many believe the convention provides and wary of
contributing to the further reification and persistence of the problem categories themselves.
8. W.E.B. DU BOIS, THE SOULS OF BLACK FOLK 8 (5th ed. 1904).
9. The Promised Land, in THE EYES ON THE PRIZE CIVIL RIGHTS READER: DOCUMENTS,
SPEECHES, AND FIRSTHAND ACCOUNTS FROM THE BLACK FREEDOM STRUGGLE 383, 402 (Clayborne
Carson et al. eds., 1991) (quoting Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.).
10. DU BOIS, supra note 8, at 12.
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remark frequently invoked today by public health practitioners, Dr.
King also emphasized the moral outrage attending health disparities:
“Of all the forms of inequality, injustice in health is the most
shocking and the most inhuman because it often results in physical
death.”11
The political and rhetorical currency of disparity discourse and
disparity data in modern societies, committed in principle to equality,
is apparent on its face. With increasing regularity over the course of
the past two decades, commentary on racial disparities has become
ubiquitous in political and academic debate. Social scientists,
journalists, public health practitioners, legal scholars, and the
political commentariat routinely use race as an independent variable
to track and discuss disparate outcomes with respect to police
violence, criminal sentencing, health (including COVID-19),
housing, employment, wealth, and income, just to name a few
contexts. Disparity discourse is one of the truth-telling modes of our
era; it is the primary language through which we analyze the
concepts of race and racism today. The ubiquity of disparity
discourse is one of the basic premises of this intervention, and I am
interested in exploring the consequences and potential trajectories of
that phenomenon rather than demonstrating the accuracy of any
particular empirical or descriptive disparity claims.
For present purposes, it suffices to quote the pithy and tragic
distillation of affairs from political scientists Rogers Smith and
Desmond King: “The familiar, painful litany of the United States’
continuing and severe racial gaps in material well-being encompasses
virtually every dimension of life, from economic well-being to health
to housing to education to the criminal justice system.”12 As such,
disparity discourse arises out of real material depredations, and to
that extent, it is hardly surprising to see its proliferation in overtly
11. See Charlene Galarneau, Getting King’s Words Right, 29 J. HEALTH CARE POOR &
UNDERSERVED 5, 5 (2018) (quoting Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.).
12. Rogers M. Smith & Desmond S. King, Barack Obama and the Future of American Racial
Politics, 6 DU BOIS REV. 25, 26 (2009); see also MICHAEL C. DAWSON, NOT IN OUR LIFETIMES: THE
FUTURE OF BLACK POLITICS 116 (2011).
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political contexts as well as in ostensibly nonpolitical contexts like
public health research centers. It recalls Theodor Adorno’s maxim:
“Woe speaks: ‘Go.’”13 Disparity data calls to mind physical and
psychological pain, which “tells our knowledge that suffering ought
not to be, that things should be different.”14 But if woe speaks go,
where, exactly, are we supposed to go? This is another formulation of
the Symposium theme: after we acknowledge the woe, what’s next?
What is the political vector on which racial disparity data sets our
course?
This Essay aims to clarify these questions by exploring some of
the largely unmapped theoretical terrain underlying much disparity
discourse. Part I introduces three recent political episodes that
demonstrate how the rhetoric of racial disparity can be mobilized for
an astonishingly wide range of political uses, impliedly underscoring
the need to clarify some concepts and terms. The next two Parts
undertake that project by situating racial disparity discourse in a
theoretical context. First, Part II explains how most racial disparity
discourse in the United States is predicated on a model of
rationalistic discourse undertaken by coequal interlocutors with the
shared expectation of reaching a consensus once the cognitive gap
between the interlocutors is bridged through strategic rhetorical use
of disparity data. Then, Part III draws from philosopher Charles Mills
and sociologists Moon-Kie Jung and Pierre Bourdieu to argue that
the basic discursive conditions for a dialogue of the sort envisioned
by the discourse theorists are not present, owing to cognitive
pathologies and epistemological shortcomings, handicapping the
abilities of many Americans to engage in rationalistic discourse on
matters related to race.
Following that, in Parts IV, V, and VI, this Essay argues that
antiracists interested in eliminating racial disparities should focus
their efforts on using disparity data within a reinvigorated radical
13. THEODOR W. ADORNO, NEGATIVE DIALECTICS 203 (E.B. Ashton trans., Continuum Publ’g
1973) (1966).
14. Id.
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Black politics, conceived along the lines of what political theorist
Chantal Mouffe has called “agonistic pluralism.” Mouffe’s agonistic
pluralism foregrounds conflict and conversion over conversations
and convincing, and seeks to articulate an alternative political project
dedicated to coalition building based on egalitarian principles.15 Such
a radical Black politics is not meant as a passive, receptacle category
collecting together the activities of all Black people engaged in
radical politics at a given point in time. Instead, the category is meant
to refer to an insurgent politics dedicated to organizing programs,
associations, alliances, and legal reform efforts aiming to eradicate
racialized hierarchies and disparities throughout the social formation,
as well as challenging those parts of the political economy that
reciprocally nurture and feed off those arbitrary hierarchies and
differences.
One further terminological clarification is in order here:
throughout this Essay, I consider the pragmatic possibilities of
discourse between Black and White Americans,16 and I will discuss
certain potentials in radical Black politics. In doing so, I do not mean
to ignore the multiple other racialized categories that have played,
and continue to play, constitutive roles in U.S. politics and society.
Instead, the predominant, but not exclusive, focus on the history,
politics, and lived disparities of Black Americans is attributable to
the special role that Black politics has played in U.S. history and the
concomitant special power Black politics has to galvanize challenges
to the established racial order.17 That said, I suspect that the

15. See infra Parts IV, V, VI.
16. This focus of this Essay is on race discourse in the United States, where race has played a
constitutive role in developing notions of the polity, culture, and the broader social formation. As David
Roediger puts it, whereas “[t]he world got along without race for the overwhelming majority of its
history, the U.S. has never been without it.” DAVID R. ROEDIGER, HOW RACE SURVIVED U.S. HISTORY:
FROM SETTLEMENT AND SLAVERY TO THE ECLIPSE OF POST-RACIALISM, at xii (2008) (cleaned up).
Nevertheless, it is of course likely that, given the persistence of race thinking and racism in many
regions of the world, some of the concepts and arguments presented in this Essay will apply in those
other contexts as well.
17. Nikhil Singh’s observation that the ample Black radical tradition operates an immanent critique
of American claims to universality is relevant here. See NIKHIL PAL SINGH, BLACK IS A COUNTRY 219
(2005).
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theoretical framework explored here will have ready application in
the context of other racialized groups as well.
I. THE MUDDLED POLITICS OF THE MOMENT IN THREE EPISODES
The problem is that disparity politics are, at present, hopelessly
muddled. And muddled, disorganized politics complicate efforts to
marshal information about racial disparities in service of focused
efforts to achieve meaningful changes in material social conditions.
Indeed, sometimes the people bringing up racial disparities are
ideologically committed to maintaining those disparities. For an even
larger group, the oceanic disparities themselves, provided they are
deracialized, are not even cognizable as problems in and of
themselves. Worse still, this latter group might make honest efforts to
change the material conditions of oppressed people susceptible to
co-optation by forces dedicated to preserving those same conditions.
Stuart Hall evocatively described this process as the “stitching” of
otherwise volatile and oppositional cultural practices and social
movements into the dominant social formation.18 Amidst these
muddled disparity politics, we need to focus our attention on the
multiple trajectories on which concrete, material interests can project
otherwise neutral social scientific information like racial disparity
data.19
In recent years, the multiple trajectories of the Black Lives Matter
movement illustrate the flexible and protean discursive environment
where disparity discourse thrives. In August of 2016, the Movement
for Black Lives (M4BL), a coalition of over fifty organizations
formed in response to outcry over racially disparate treatment by the
police, published an ambitious policy platform entitled A Vision for
Black Lives: Policy Demands for Black Power, Freedom, and

18. STUART HALL, CULTURAL STUDIES 1983: A THEORETICAL HISTORY 189 (Jennifer Daryl Slack
& Lawrence Grossberg eds., 2016).
19. See Adolph Reed Jr., The Post-1965 Trajectory of Race, Class, and Urban Politics in the United
States Reconsidered, 41 LAB. STUD. J. 260, 278 (2016).
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Justice.20 That document sets forth aspirational goals relating to six
arenas: (1) ending forms of state-sponsored racial violence against
Black people; (2) reparations from state and nonstate institutions for
racial subjugation; (3) divestment from institutions responsible for
“criminalizing, caging, and harming” Black people, along with other
exploitative forces such as prisons, fossil fuels, police, and
surveillance; (4) “economic justice for all and a reconstruction of the
economy”; (5) direct democratic “control [of] the laws, institutions,
and policies that are meant to serve us—from our schools to our local
budgets, economies, police departments, and our land”; and (6) a
“remaking of the current U.S. political system in order to create a real
democracy where Black people and all marginalized people can
effectively exercise full political power.”21 Just to highlight a few of
the more concrete proposals, the document calls for community
control over institutions like the police and schools; participatory
budgeting at the local, state, and federal levels; decommodification of
housing; abolishment of capital punishment; permanent cessation of
deportation; reworking the tax code to effectuate a “radical and
sustainable redistribution of wealth”; institution of a universal basic
income; breaking up large financial institutions; and public financing
of elections.22 Robin Kelley might even understate matters when he
describes the document as a “remarkable blueprint for social
transformation.”23 It also echoes the Black Panther Party’s famous
“Ten-Point Program.”24 It is a plan not just to end structural racism

20. See generally MOVEMENT FOR BLACK LIVES, A VISION FOR BLACK LIVES: POLICY DEMANDS
BLACK POWER, FREEDOM, AND JUSTICE (2016), https://cjc.net/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/AVision-For-Black-Lives-Policy-Demands-For-Black-Power-Freedom-and-Justice.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5K8A-BDPB].
21. Id. at 6–15.
22. See id.
23. Robin D.G. Kelley, What Does Black Lives Matter Want?, BOS. REV. (Aug. 17, 2016),
http://bostonreview.net/books-ideas/robin-d-g-kelley-movement-black-lives-vision
[https://perma.cc/3SJK-CHKS].
24. For a description of the Ten-Point Program, see MICHAEL C. DAWSON, BLACKS IN AND OUT OF
THE LEFT 137–40 (2013).
FOR
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but also to save the planet and transform the entire nation along the
way.25
This past year, in the immediate aftermath of the convulsive street
protests following the videotaped state lynching of George Floyd,
Jamie Dimon (the head of JPMorgan Chase & Co., the nation’s
largest bank) “took a knee” in a staged photograph with corporate
staff.26 A few months later, the bank announced a $30 billion
“Advancing Black Pathways” program that, the bank promised,
would fund tens of thousands of home mortgage and small business
loans for “Black, Latinx and minority” borrowers, finance 100,000
affordable housing units, and mentor “thousands of Black
students.”27 Never mind that the bank had recently settled a civil
enforcement action in which the government alleged that the bank
had discriminated against Black and Hispanic homeowners by
charging them higher interest rates and loan fees than similarly
situated White borrowers. Even more fundamentally, no one with
even a glancing familiarity with JPMorgan and banks like it thinks
that the net effect of the company’s real estate lending practices, over
any time horizon, will amount to anything other than
rent-intensifying redevelopment that displaces economically
disadvantaged minority communities.28 And yet, all that
25. See Kelley, supra note 23.
26. Lananh Nguyen et al., Banks Snared in Race Conversation, Confronted by Bleak Legacy,
BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK
(June
16,
2020,
11:28
AM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-06-16/banks-snared-in-race-conversation-confrontedby-bleak-legacy [https://perma.cc/6MFG-N5RK].
27. See Isabel Togoh, JP Morgan Pledges $30 Billion to Help Remedy Racial Wealth Gap, FORBES
(Oct. 8, 2020, 5:53 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/isabeltogoh/2020/10/08/jp-morgan-pledges-30billion-to-help-remedy-racial-wealth-gap/?sh=5eb34105594d
[https://perma.cc/CKJ7-AF5U];
Advancing
Black
Pathways,
JPMORGAN
CHASE
&
CO.,
https://www.jpmorganchase.com/impact/people/advancing-black-pathways
[https://perma.cc/AN2XQMFF].
28. See, e.g., CAL. REINVESTMENT COALITION, ANTI-DISPLACEMENT CODE OF CONDUCT: HOW
BANKS, PRIVATE EQUITY AND WALL STREET CAN STOP CONTRIBUTING TO DISPLACEMENT (2018),
https://cceda.com/wp-content/uploads/Anti-displacement-best-practices-10.16.18.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7AMP-VQV2] (linking the role of bank finance to eviction, displacement, and
homelessness); THE GREENLINING INST., ECONOMIC EQUITY: THE STATE OF GENTRIFICATION:
HOME-LENDING TO COMMUNITIES OF COLOR IN CALIFORNIA 3 (2017), http://greenlining.org/wpcontent/uploads/2017/12/State-of-Gentrification-Home-Lending-to-Communities-of-Color-inCalifornia.pdf [https://perma.cc/QXZ9-VXW7] (documenting how large banks originate home loans in
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notwithstanding, the bank was compelled to issue the following
ceremonial proclamation to accompany the announcement:
“Systemic racism is a tragic part of America’s history. We can do
more and do better to break down systems that have propagated
racism and widespread economic inequality, especially for Black and
Latinx people. It’s long past time that society addresses racial
inequities in a more tangible, meaningful way.”29
Three days after Dimon took a knee, prominent members of the
Democratic Party like Nancy Pelosi, Chuck Schumer, and Steny
Hoyer did the same—while wearing Kente cloth!—in an attempt to
demonstrate their solidarity with the Black Lives Matter protests.30
Juxtaposed with the Dimon performance, the staged photo op can
only be described as a “hold my beer” moment—one that was equal
parts disorienting, comical, and offensive. These same politicians had
established track records that flagrantly contradicted every item in
the M4BL vision—track records that were not merely historical
artifacts, but present realities on which they had recently doubled
down.31
So how are we to interpret these seemingly incongruent moments?
In reality, the incongruities are much more pervasive than even these
episodes suggest. Nevertheless, at a minimum, they highlight the
flexibility of both the basic Black Lives Matter message and the
perception of racially disparate treatment that gives it life.
The same could be said about racial disparity discourse; its
capaciousness provides it with its potential power, but also its
susceptibility to co-optation and rudderless ineffectuality. Obviously,
low- to moderate-income census tracts at rates that vastly exceed the rates at which they lend to low- to
moderate-income borrowers).
29. Our Path Forward, JPMORGAN CHASE & CO., https://www.jpmorganchase.com/impact/pathforward [https://perma.cc/2BHK-FYDM] (quoting JPMorgan Chase & Co. Chairman and CEO, Jamie
Dimon).
30. Doreen St. Félix, The Embarrassment of Democrats Wearing Kente-Cloth Stoles, THE NEW
YORKER
(June
9,
2020),
https://www.newyorker.com/culture/on-and-off-the-avenue/theembarrassment-of-democrats-wearing-kente-cloth-stoles [https://perma.cc/8MLA-QZAF].
31. See David Dayen, Nancy Pelosi Rams Austerity Provision into House Rules Package over
Objections
of
Progressives,
THE
INTERCEPT
(Jan.
2,
2019,
10:43
AM),
https://theintercept.com/2019/01/02/nancy-pelosi-pay-go-rule/ [https://perma.cc/M6AP-U8FC].
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we must acknowledge as a first principle that no effective political
movement can include people committed to decommodified housing
alongside JPMorgan commercial real estate lenders, or people
committed to prison abolition and forcible break-ups of financial
institutions alongside the politicians that have shepherded the
Democratic leadership through its neoliberal transmogrification,32
during which the party has replaced its commitment to social
provision with marketization principles and hyper-incarceration.33 If
we are going to have honest conversations about racial disparities in
the United States, we need to know what we are talking about and
why we are doing so, and these juxtaposed images demonstrate that
we all too frequently fail both these tests. It will not suffice to scratch
our heads in bewilderment; these episodes are significant signposts
on the terrain on which politics is being conducted today.
To some extent, this confusion and mixed messaging is
unsurprising. After all, only one-half of one branch of our national
government has ever apologized for slavery.34 And no branch of our
government has ever apologized for the genocide of indigenous
Americans. No reparations have been paid to descendants of either
group; no truth and reconciliation commissions have been established
to reckon with the legacies of either historical reality. A full quarter
of the country’s landmass is littered with statues and memorials
glorifying political and military leaders that would not be there were

32. See generally Adolph Reed Jr., Nothing Left: The Long, Slow Surrender of American Liberals,
HARPER’S
MAG.
(Mar.
2014),
https://harpers.org/archive/2014/03/nothing-left-2/
[https://perma.cc/W494-KUEL].
33. “Hyper-incarceration” is a term introduced by sociologist Loïc Wacquant to refer to the carceral
state, unprecedented in human history, that has emerged in the United States over the past several
decades, often with explicit cooperation from the Kente-robed legislators demonstrating solidarity with
anti-police violence protesters. See Loïc Wacquant, Class, Race and Hyperincarceration in Revanchist
America, 139 DÆDALUS 74, 78 (2010); LOÏC WACQUANT, PUNISHING THE POOR: THE NEOLIBERAL
GOVERNMENT OF SOCIAL INSECURITY 99–100, 304 (Duke Univ. Press 2009) (2004) [hereinafter
WACQUANT, PUNISHING THE POOR]; Loïc Wacquant, Deadly Symbiosis: When Ghetto and Prison Meet
and Match, 3 PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 95, 118 (2001) [hereinafter Wacquant, Deadly Symbiosis] (“[T]he
penal tutelage of African Americans has escalated to heights experienced by no other group in history,
even under the most repressive authoritarian regimes and in Soviet-style societies.”).
34. Congress Apologizes for Slavery, Jim Crow, NPR (July 30, 2008, 12:00 PM),
https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=93059465 [https://perma.cc/67JM-T4FF].
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it not for the fact that they were defending the institution of slavery.
Antiracist politics are, as always, facing headwinds in the United
States; the only question is whether those headwinds buffet so
strongly that the only sensible course of action is to redirect around
them and re-strategize the way we think about this problem
altogether.
The discussion that follows below surveys some of the theoretical
terrain underlying the episodes highlighted here, along with countless
other similar episodes. Social theory provides a roadmap for our
social environment, and the aim here is to use theory to elucidate
some of the very real practical consequences of disparity discourse
on contemporary social and political life.
II. MAINSTREAM RACIAL DISPARITY DISCOURSE AS A
HABERMASIAN PROJECT
Imagine a hypothetical colloquy in which an antiracist approaches
an acquaintance otherwise disinclined to antiracist politics,
burnishing disparity data amply demonstrating the gulf between the
material and psychic experiences of White Americans and Black
Americans. Let us assume that the antiracist’s interlocutor is open in
principle to being convinced about the need to remedy the disparate
and inferior experiences and realities of nonwhite fellow citizens.
The antiracist hopes to open the interlocutor’s eyes to the history and
enduring legacy of racism in the United States and to thereby
catalyze a new commitment on their part to an antiracist politics
seeking to enfold Black Americans into the social formation as full
social equals.35 The problem, we will see, is that the pragmatic
conditions of possibility for a colloquy of this sort are far more
complicated than many antiracists acknowledge.

35. Note that the more frequent formulation of this idea—refracted through the ideologically
inflected terms “equality of outcome” and “equality of opportunity”—is deliberately avoided in this
Essay.
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The basic discursive conditions of a colloquy like this are premised
on the notion that the problem is one of knowledge36—that if our
fellow citizen-listeners only learn more, they will agree with us. The
colloquy is predicated, then, on a cognitive gap between the antiracist
and the interlocutor. This cognitive gap can consist of both moral
arguments concerning, for example, what a just society requires, as
well as factual–historical arguments concerning, for example, the
extent or cause of the empirical disparity.37 Good liberals and
deliberative democrats will hope that a thorough ventilation of the
arguments on, say, the increased mortality risk that pregnant Black
women face, will eventually produce a rough agreement as to the real
qualities of the phenomenon—its statistical manifestation, the causal
environment out of which it arises, its arbitrariness and unfairness,
and so forth. They might even hope to reach an agreement on how
this health disparity problem might be solved.
At bottom, conversations like the colloquy hypothesized here are
grounded in a model of rationalist, agreement-seeking discourse
according to which free and equal participants submit their facts and
arguments to the test of shared validity criteria. In this sort of
encounter, the predicate relations among the interlocutors are
arranged, as Seyla Benhabib describes it, so that “what is considered
in the common interest of all . . . results from processes
of . . . deliberation conducted rationally and fairly among free and

36. The same could be said about coverage of racial disparities that have figured prominently in
cable and print news media in recent years.
37. Moral argumentation in the context of racial disparities can take many forms. Philosopher Chris
Lebron provides one example of moral argumentation in this context when he explains the cleavage
between the “two realities” of Black Americans and many non-antiracist Americans—for instance, the
deeply held belief by many in the latter category that the Civil Rights era established a permanent
equality—not as “a matter of error, but of will.” Chris Lebron, Race, Truth, and Our Two Realities,
N.Y. TIMES: THE STONE (July 11, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/11/opinion/race-truth-andour-two-realities.html [https://perma.cc/3AU6-MC5E]. According to this line of argument, if White
Americans only possessed greater moral fortitude, discursive agreement would (eventually) follow.
Even though the emphasis is moral rather than empirical, this type of account is predicated on discursive
rationality and diverges sharply from the account presented by Mills and Jung below. See WILLIAM
OUTHWAITE, HABERMAS: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 44 (2009) (noting how Habermas believed that
both empirical and ethical judgments could be validated by discursive practices rationally oriented to
consensus).
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equal individuals.”38 The aim of this type of discourse is to generate a
rationally motivated consensus on controversial claims through the
“force of the better argument” alone.39 In our hypothetical setting of a
discussion on racial disparities, the endgame is achieving some sort
of transracial coalition of the discursively convinced.
Jürgen Habermas, the primary theorist of this type of
rational-discursive grounding of social action, posits four pragmatic
presuppositions for discourse: publicity and inclusiveness, equal
rights to engage in communication, exclusion of deception and
illusion, and the absence of coercion.40 Further, Habermas posits that
this type of rational discourse is underwritten by a “lifeworld” that
appears as a “reservoir of taken-for-granteds, of unshaken
convictions that participants in communication draw upon in
cooperative processes of interpretation.”41 The lifeworld is the
“background horizon of unthematized assumptions, implicit
expectations, and individual know-how within which communicative
action unfolds.”42 The lifeworld and communicative action are
reciprocally constitutive; that is, the lifeworld enables
communication, while the communication itself ensures continuation
of the lifeworld.43 In the public realm of politics, the possibility or
expectation of discursive agreement on contentious matters of public
concern then stabilizes the institutional arrangements of
liberal-democratic societies.44
These concepts of discourse and lifeworld are crucial in
Habermasian social theory. Modern societies, no longer able to
38. Seyla Benhabib, Deliberative Democracy and Models of Democratic Legitimacy, 1
CONSTELLATIONS 26, 30–31 (1994).
39. SEYLA BENHABIB, CRITIQUE, NORM, AND UTOPIA: A STUDY OF THE FOUNDATIONS OF CRITICAL
THEORY 284, 286 (1986); see also THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE CRITICAL THEORY OF JÜRGEN
HABERMAS 303 (1978).
40. See JÜRGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN NATURALISM AND RELIGION: PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS 49–
50 (Ciaran Cronin trans., 2008).
41. JÜRGEN HABERMAS, 2 THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION: SYSTEM AND LIFEWORLD
AND SYSTEM: A CRITIQUE OF FUNCTIONALIST REASON 124 (Thomas McCarthy trans., 1987).
42. BENHABIB, supra note 39, at 239.
43. See id. at 125; JÜRGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A
DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY 22 (William Rehg trans., 1996).
44. See CHANTAL MOUFFE, THE DEMOCRATIC PARADOX 94 (2000).
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anchor social integration with religious and traditional lifeworld
certainties, rely instead on this discursive, consensus-oriented
communicative action to integrate social groups and socialize
individuals.45 A solidarity emerges not as the result of traditional
lifeworld relationships stitching together an ethnocentrically and
geographically isolated collectivity, but as a result of the “realization
that each person must take responsibility for the other because as
consociates all must have an interest in the integrity of their shared
life context in the same way.”46 In using the terms integration and
solidarity, Habermas refers to the core problem of order, a
preoccupation of all classical and contemporary social theory.47 But
in the context of American racism, history, and politics, the
integration concept has an obvious double valence inasmuch as
(1) social order has always been defined in racial terms and (2) actual
integration of (and solidarity between) the races has always
threatened established social order.
This dissonant chord played alongside two concepts otherwise
denoting harmony clues us in to a real problem with reliance on
discursive rationality to address race in the United States. Michael
Dawson has documented the wide gulf separating Black and White
public opinion in the United States, and he argues that the divide
testifies to completely different normative and interpretive ways of
seeing and experiencing the world.48
Writing two decades ago, well before the era of the Tea Party and
Trump,49 political scientists Donald Kinder and Lynn Sanders
45. See HABERMAS, supra note 41, at 63.
46. Jürgen Habermas, Justice and Solidarity: On the Discussion Concerning “Stage 6,” 21 PHIL. F.
32, 47 (1989); see also JÜRGEN HABERMAS, MORAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND COMMUNICATIVE ACTION
200 (Christian Lenhardt & Shierry Weber Nicholsen trans., 1990) (locating the source of morality in the
mutually constitutive concepts of justice and solidarity, with the latter referring to “the well-being of
associated members of a community who inter-subjectively share the same lifeworld”).
47. For two of the classics, see C. WRIGHT MILLS, THE SOCIOLOGICAL IMAGINATION 44 (2000); and
TALCOTT PARSONS, THE STRUCTURE OF SOCIAL ACTION 377 (1937).
48. See generally DAWSON, supra note 12.
49. The two shorthand references here are intended to refer to a broad trend in U.S. public discourse
over the past two decades that is characterized by, if anything, racialized concepts assuming a greater
salience. See WENDY BROWN, IN THE RUINS OF NEOLIBERALISM: THE RISE OF ANTIDEMOCRATIC
POLITICS IN THE WEST 5–7 (2019). Wendy Brown evocatively describes the “ferocious antidemocratic
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warned that their research on public opinions suggested that
communal dialogue and consensus-formation was unlikely to move
the needle on matters related to race:
[T]he most striking feature of [American] public opinion on
race is how emphatically black and white Americans
disagree with each other. . . . Many contemporary theorists
of democracy urge communal dialogues designed to
uncover or create consensus among Americans on matters
of public concern. Racial matters obviously qualify as
pressing public concerns, but the evidence presented here
of a deep and perhaps widening racial divide makes the
discovery of commonality and agreement between the races
a dim prospect. When it comes to questions of race policy
in the United States, this particular vision of contemporary
democratic theorists looks to be more a distant aspiration
than a realistic immediate goal.50
Dawson himself wonders if this dynamic might mean that Black
and White Americans, presently as always, lack a shared lifeworld
that can serve as a basis for mutual understanding.51 Without a
lifeworld of shared background assumptions that the antiracist and
the interlocutor from our earlier hypothetical can take for granted,
how can they engage in the type of discussion we imagine them
undertaking?
What if Dawson is correct? What if the cognitive gap when it
comes to the empirics and ethics of racial disparity is not bridgeable,
as the discourse theorists assume it is? More specifically, what if
many White Americans only have recourse to an “epistemology of
forces in the second decade of the twenty-first century” as fueled by an “attack on equality, combined
with mobilization of traditional values, . . . [which] turn[ed] up the heat on and legitimate[d]
long-simmering racisms from colonial and slave legacies . . . .” Id. at 7.
50. DONALD R. KINDER & LYNN M. SANDERS, DIVIDED BY COLOR: RACIAL POLITICS AND
DEMOCRATIC IDEALS 33 (1996) (emphasis added).
51. See DAWSON, supra note 12, at 5.
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ignorance”52 that prevents them from transforming the disparity data
into changed political and moral beliefs? What if these
cognitive-epistemological shortcomings deprive them of shared
lifeworld presuppositions requisite for discursive agreement,
diminishing, or even eliminating, their ability to recognize “the force
of the better argument”53 when it comes to the enduring legacy of
race thinking in the United States? What if, instead of interpreting
disparity data in a manner that facilitates the formation of an
enlightened transracial coalition of the discursively convinced, they
interpret the disparities as empirical confirmation of their own
preconceptions of naturalized racial hierarchies?54
Consider the harrowing statistic that one in three newborn Black
boys in the United States today should expect to go to prison in his
lifetime.55 Of course, some will interpret that statistic as evidence that
a hyperactive and hypertrophic carceral apparatus has become
unmoored from human reason and as a call to rethink that system and
much of the broader political economy root and branch.56 Still, others
might rationalize statistics like this as confirmation of their beliefs,
whether conscious or unconscious, that Black American males are
prone to criminality and violence, or are the unavoidable casualties of
trenchant “underclass” pathologies traceable to federal welfare policy
or poor decision-making by their forbears, or are more able to handle
the physical and psychic toll of imprisonment, or are simply less able

52. See CHARLES W. MILLS, BLACK RIGHTS/WHITE WRONGS: THE CRITIQUE OF RACIAL
LIBERALISM 71 (2018) [hereinafter MILLS, BLACK RIGHTS/WHITE WRONGS]; CHARLES W. MILLS, THE
RACIAL CONTRACT 93 (1997) [hereinafter MILLS, THE RACIAL CONTRACT].
53. BENHABIB, supra note 39, at 286.
54. See Rebecca C. Hetey & Jennifer L. Eberhardt, Racial Disparities in Incarceration Increase
Acceptance of Punitive Policies, 25 PSYCH. SCI. 1949, 1949 (2014) (presenting survey research
demonstrating that “[e]xposure to extreme racial disparities . . . can lead people to support the very
policies that produce those disparities, thus perpetuating a vicious cycle”).
55. THE SENT’G PROJECT, REPORT OF THE SENTENCING PROJECT TO THE UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL
RAPPORTEUR ON CONTEMPORARY FORMS OF RACISM, RACIAL DISCRIMINATION, XENOPHOBIA, AND
RELATED INTOLERANCE: REGARDING RACIAL DISPARITIES IN THE UNITED STATES CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SYSTEM 1 (2018), https://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/un-report-on-racial-disparities/
[https://perma.cc/BF6G-65PW].
56. See supra note 33 and accompanying text (discussing the historically unprecedented vastness of
the contemporary U.S. carceral system).
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to elicit a sympathetic response when compared to their own relatives
or the kids in their (still segregated)57 neighborhoods. The disparity
might also be rationalized by conscious or unconscious anxieties
about the political demands that currently incarcerated people might
be expected to make if they were liberated or not imprisoned in the
first place, and the potential ramifications of those demands on their
own investments in presently existing social institutions. Ultimately,
the prevalence of these attitudes is an empirical question, albeit one
that is difficult to assess. Still, the evident failure of existing
institutions to redress the issue,58 notwithstanding its flagrant
contradiction of the professed political and moral commitments of
the polity, suggests that we should, at least provisionally, lower our
expectations of discovering a lifeworld consensus on matters of race
in the United States.
If so, then we should also expect, as Kinder and Sanders have
suggested, that most rationalist discourse aimed at transforming
White racial beliefs will fall flat. The conditions of possibility for the
hypothetical colloquy are far too distant from the idealized situations
envisioned by the theorists of discursive, communicative
rationality.59 To be clear, the argument is not that conversations about
race between friends, family, and colleagues might never budge the
needle on racism at the individual level. Most of us have ample
personal experience with that sort of dialogue, and we are much the
better for it. Instead, the argument is that attempting to ground an
57. See Jenny Schuetz, Metro Areas Are Still Racially Segregated, BROOKINGS: THE AVE. (Dec. 8,
2017), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/the-avenue/2017/12/08/metro-areas-are-still-racially-segregated/
[https://perma.cc/AN6Y-ZPKN].
58. As of July 2021, during a period of historically unprecedented attention on documented police
brutality, the signature piece of national legislation offering a (modest) curtailment of the hyper-carceral
state, the George Floyd Justice in Policing Act, is mired in gridlock. See Sarah D. Wire, George Floyd’s
Death Sparked Calls for Police Reform. Why Hasn’t Congress Acted?, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 20, 2021),
https://www.latimes.com/politics/story/2021-04-20/whatever-happened-to-police-reform-legislation
[https://perma.cc/L97B-9VRH]. Meanwhile, large states with significant Black populations have
legislated decisively to prevent even putting police budgets meaningfully in discussion. See, e.g., Mark
Niesse, Kemp Signs Ban on Defunding Police, ATLANTA J.-CONST., May 10, 2021, at 1B.
59. See supra text accompanying note 40. In Habermasian terms, the “pragmatic presuppositions” of
discourse are not present, especially the condition that there is no deception or illusion on the part of
participants. See supra text accompanying note 40.
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effective antiracist and anti-disparitarian politics on rational
discourse with White Americans might very well be a fool’s errand.
Worse still, if the deliberative and discursive model of politics is
likely to stall out when it comes to matters of race in the United
States, then insisting on that sort of politics, and therefore holding
forth the expectation that some transracial consensus should be
achievable, might undermine political programs seeking to eliminate
racial disparities that are predicated on other foundations. The
expectation of a possible agreement among interlocutors sharing the
same lifeworld shifts blame for failure to agree onto the individual
interlocutors’ behavioral and attitudinal attributes, directing attention
away from the structural features of the culture and the political
economy, including their power dynamics and historical trajectories,
that are responsible for having produced the disparities in the first
place.60 The humming presses churning out copies of the latest titles
in the new cottage industry of how-to-talk-about-race guidebooks—
White Fragility: Why It’s So Hard for White People to Talk About
Racism;61 How to Argue with a Racist;62 Let’s Talk Race: A Guide
for White People;63 So You Want to Talk About Race;64 Why I’m No
Longer Talking to White People About Race65—testify to the
contemporary salience of the discursive frame and the potential threat
it poses. By continuing to invest in therapeutic interventions designed
to combat individual prejudice for the sake of improved discursive
understanding, we risk ignoring Frantz Fanon’s sage counsel to

60. See WENDY BROWN, REGULATING AVERSION: TOLERANCE IN THE AGE OF IDENTITY AND
EMPIRE 142–43 (2006).
61. See generally ROBIN DIANGELO, WHITE FRAGILITY: WHY IT’S SO HARD FOR WHITE PEOPLE TO
TALK ABOUT RACISM (2018).
62. See generally ADAM RUTHERFORD, HOW TO ARGUE WITH A RACIST: WHAT OUR GENES DO
(AND DON’T) SAY ABOUT HUMAN DIFFERENCE (2020).
63. See generally FERN L. JOHNSON & MARLENE G. FINE, LET’S TALK RACE: A GUIDE FOR WHITE
PEOPLE (2021).
64. See generally IJEOMA OLUO, SO YOU WANT TO TALK ABOUT RACE (2018).
65. See generally RENI EDDO-LODGE, WHY I’M NO LONGER TALKING TO WHITE PEOPLE ABOUT
RACE (2017).
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abandon “[t]he habit of considering racism as a mental quirk, as a
psychological flaw.”66
Individualizing and psychologizing the problem in this manner
operates as an ideological conceit.67 It depoliticizes racial disparities
and racism,68 dissipating political energy into therapeutic endeavors
to awaken (as in, make “woke”) individual people at the expense of
developing radical politics up to the task of countervailing the
political, economic, and cultural hierarchies responsible for
reproducing the disparities.69 Of course, racialized hierarchies
manifest themselves in individual psyches, but the important point is
that the discourse frame tends to reduce racialized hierarchies to an
emergent, aggregate result of deviant, prejudicial psyches, rather than
appreciating their antecedent influence on those individual psyches.
Thus, insistence on discourse, where the pragmatic preconditions
for discourse are not present, impedes efforts to investigate the
causes underlying problems while participants prattle past each other,
more likely bandying ideological tropes rather than progressing to
consensus. (Readers who use social media will appreciate this point
immediately). In short, looking to discourse to dissolve racial
divisions and disparities might not only be pointless, but pernicious
too.
As discussed in greater detail below in Part V, looking to discourse
to dissolve racial divisions and disparities undermines its putative

66. FRANTZ FANON, TOWARD THE AFRICAN REVOLUTION 38 (Haakon Chevalier trans., 1967).
67. See Lani Guinier, From Racial Liberalism to Racial Literacy: Brown v. Board of Education and
the Interest-Divergence Dilemma, 91 J. AM. HIST. 92, 100 (2004). See generally LEAH N. GORDON,
FROM POWER TO PREJUDICE: THE RISE OF RACIAL INDIVIDUALISM IN MIDCENTURY AMERICA (2015)
(describing ideological thematization of racism as an individual psychological problem).
68. See BROWN, supra note 60, at 15–16 (discussing ideological and depoliticizing effects of treating
social structures as personal psychological matters).
69. The discourse frame sheds light on a dialectical contradiction implicit in the predominant liberal
conceptualization of racism: most liberal antiracists insist on the ubiquity of racism, on its status as a
mass, systemic social phenomenon, all the while they urge the application of a remedy at the individual
psychological, rather than the systemic (i.e., cultural and political–economic), level. The point is hardly
that individuals lack agency to change their attitudes and even improve society. Nevertheless, a
predominantly therapeutic, didactic, psychologizing approach neutralizes the political energy required to
harness those agencies to reform or re-form the political culture and economy so that it stops
reproducing racialized hierarchies and disparities in the first place.
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objectives in two further ways. First, it distracts from other efforts to
build solidaristic political constituencies capable of mounting a
credible threat to the established racialized order.70 Second, it
arguably entrenches that same established order (and the disparities it
reproduces) insofar as it offers opportunities for bank executives,
tech tycoons, and politicians to co-opt otherwise oppositional
energies by presenting the disparities as a social problem to be
resolved within the established order.71 In this way, otherwise radical
and oppositional potentials within the citizenry are incorporated or
“stitched into”72 the dominant, established social formation.73 In fact,
thinking of co-optation in this manner helps clarify the otherwise
confounding, head-scratching images of bankers and politicians
“taking a knee.” Together, these factors produce the paradoxical
result that reliance on discourse to redress racism ends up bolstering
the legitimacy of the established order against which antiracists are
struggling.
III. A PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLANATION AND A SOCIOLOGICAL
EXPLANATION FOR THE PRESENT IMPRACTICALITY OF AN EFFECTIVE
ANTI-DISPARITARIAN POLITICS GROUNDED IN DISCOURSE
Despite the hopes of those who would like to use discourse and
communicative rationality to achieve progressive consensus on
racism in the United States, using disparity data as part of a project to
eliminate those disparities and promote a more egalitarian society
should not be conceptualized predominantly, or perhaps even at all,
as an attempt to convince White Americans of anything. The
argument here draws heavily from the philosopher Charles Mills and
the sociologist Moon-Kie Jung to explain why Habermasian

70. See infra Part V.
71. See MOUFFE, supra note 44, at 120–21.
72. See supra text accompanying note 18 (discussing Stuart Hall’s similar “stitching” metaphor).
73. See RAYMOND WILLIAMS, CULTURE AND MATERIALISM: SELECTED ESSAYS 42–51 (1980)
(theorizing hegemony as the “incorporation” of adversarial and oppositional practices into the effective
dominant culture).
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discourse is likely to fail in that project. Specifically, this Part argues
that widespread epistemological shortcomings and cognitive
pathologies will inhibit efforts by antiracists to change the dominant
conceptions of race and racism prevalent among White Americans.
Implicitly, Mills and Jung deconstruct the prospect of rationalistic
consensus on these matters and also warn us of potential unintended
negative consequences of continuing to pursue political projects
premised on that model of interaction.
Mills uses the concept of what he calls the “racial contract” to
resituate Rawlsian “social contract” theory from the realm of ideal
theory (e.g., the famous “veil of ignorance”)74 back to the historical
conditions for its possibility—conditions that are saturated
throughout with racial hierarchies. Because we live in a political
world that is grounded, both historically and presently, in racial
subordination and hierarchy, Mills argues:
Racism and racially structured discrimination have not
been deviations from the norm; they have been the norm,
not merely in the sense of de facto statistical distribution
patterns, but . . . in the sense of being formally codified,
written down and proclaimed as such. From this
perspective, the Racial Contract has underwritten the social
contract, so that duties, rights, and liberties have routinely
been assigned on a racially differentiated basis. To
understand the actual moral practice of past and present,
one needs not merely the standard abstract discussions of,
say, the conflicts in people’s consciences between
self-interest and empathy with others but a frank
appreciation of how the Racial Contract creates a
racialized moral psychology. Whites will then act in racist
ways while thinking of themselves as acting morally. In
other words, they will experience genuine cognitive
difficulties in recognizing certain behavior patterns as
74. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 142–43 (1971).
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racist, so that quite apart from questions of motivation and
bad faith they will be morally handicapped simply from the
conceptual point of view in seeing and doing the right
thing.75
To open White interlocutors’ eyes requires not only that they admit
the ugly truth of the past and present but also that they “understand[]
the ways in which these realities were made invisible, acceptable to
the white population.”76 As a result:
[O]n matters related to race, the Racial Contract prescribes
for its signatories an inverted epistemology, an
epistemology of ignorance, a particular pattern of localized
and global cognitive dysfunctions (which are
psychologically and socially functional), producing the
ironic outcome that whites will in general be unable to
understand the world they themselves have made.77
Some other perceptive theorists of race describe racism in similar
terms. Stuart Hall, for instance, links racism to the unconscious
conditions for cognition, arguing that it begins as a “profound
historical forgetfulness . . . the loss of historical memory, a kind of
historical amnesia, a decisive mental repression.”78 Michael Rogin’s
concept of “political amnesia,” by which he refers to a kind of
“motivated disavowal” or “motivated forgetting” in which “that
which is insistently represented becomes, by being normalized to
invisibility, absent and disappeared,” describes the same psychic, and
thereby cognitive, phenomenon.79 It disconnects current practices
from historical roots and prepares political subjects (like our
75.
76.
77.
78.

MILLS, THE RACIAL CONTRACT, supra note 52 (emphasis added).
Id. at 92.
Id. at 18 (emphasis added).
STUART HALL, SELECTED POLITICAL WRITINGS: THE GREAT MOVING RIGHT SHOW AND OTHER
ESSAYS 145 (2017).
79. Michael Rogin, “Make My Day!”: Spectacle As Amnesia in Imperial Politics, 29
REPRESENTATIONS 99, 103–05 (1990).
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hypothetical interlocutors) for integration within the established
social formation. As with Mills’s racial contract, political amnesia
comprises a “cultural structure” that implicates everyone to some
extent, “from those who want others to forget; to those who forgot; to
those who, with varying degrees of willfulness, never allowed
themselves to know.”80 In this text, Rogin explores the
psychoanalytic dimensions of this phenomenon, noting how spectacle
in particular facilitates political amnesia by replacing historical
memory and enabling a harmless and passive release of the (only
barely) repressed confrontation with racial domination and violence
that has always pervaded American society.81
The farcical spectacles of the current neo-McCarthyite rush of
governmental officials to sanitize the historical record of U.S. racism
in schools and the public imagination,82 or of municipal officials
incanting about the important “heritage” that confederate monuments
represent,83 are noteworthy only for their clumsiness, not their
aberrance, as examples of this widespread and entrenched American
commitment to historical amnesia.
But our hypothetical consensus-oriented antiracist advocate might
insist that the recovery of these historical memories is the entire point
of the colloquy. After all, disparity data might have the potential to
change the minds of the hypothetical interlocutors who, it is
presumed, have full agency and capacity to do so. (Recall that we
80. Id. at 105.
81. Id. at 106–07.
82. See, e.g., THE PRESIDENT’S ADVISORY 1776 COMM’N, THE 1776 REPORT 15, 31 (2021),
https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/The-Presidents-Advisory-1776Commission-Final-Report.pdf (asserting that “America’s nearly two-century effort to realize fully the
principles of the Declaration [of Independence] had reached a culmination” in 1963 before the
corrupting influence of “group rights” movements beginning in the late 1960s); Exec. Order No. 13,950,
85 Fed. Reg. 60,683 (Sept. 22, 2020) (decrying “destructive ideology . . . grounded in
misrepresentations of our country’s history,” banning instruction of “divisive concepts” by federal
agencies and contractors, and encouraging federal agencies to restrict research funding where funds will
“promote divisive concepts”); H.B. 3979, 87th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2021) (enacted legislation banning
any state school instruction exploring that “slavery and racism are anything other than deviations from,
betrayals of, or failures to live up to, the authentic founding principles of the United States”).
83. See, e.g., Donnell Suggs, Heritage or Racism? Confederate Monument’s Fate Divides
Brunswick,
GPB NEWS, https://www.gpb.org/news/2020/10/24/heritage-or-racism-confederatemonuments-fate-divides-brunswick [https://perma.cc/XNN7-U7XG] (Oct. 25, 2020, 9:50 AM).
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assumed earlier that they conceive of themselves as open in principle
to being convinced about the need to remedy the gap between the
ideal of equality and the disparate empirical realities). However,
Mills invites us to consider the unconscious beliefs that operate at
deeper cognitive levels.84 He argues that the centrality of racial
exploitation to the U.S. economy and the scale of the dimensions of
the benefits accruing to White Americans render the topic of White
racism “taboo, virtually undiscussed in the debates on justice of most
white political theory.”85 “If there is such a backlash against
affirmative action,” he wonders, “what would the response be to the
demand for the interest on the unpaid forty acres and a mule?”86 The
taboo conditioning disavowal of memory is reinforced ideologically
through concepts such as “color-blindness” and “post-raciality.”87
The immediate object of his critique here is White-dominated
political philosophy, but as noted earlier, the argument is also
epistemological: “the concept is driving the perception, with whites
aprioristically intent on denying what is before them.”88 He writes
further:
[W]hatever one’s larger meta-theoretical sympathies,
whatever approach one thinks best for investigating these
ideational matters, such concerns obviously need to be part
of a social epistemology. . . . [I]n certain areas this
conceptual apparatus is likely going to be negatively
shaped and inflected in various ways by the biases of the
ruling group(s). . . . Moreover, what cognitive psychology
has revealed is that rather than continually challenging
conceptual adequacy by the test of disconfirming empirical
data, we tend to do the opposite—to interpret the data
through the grid of the concepts in such a way that
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

See MILLS, THE RACIAL CONTRACT, supra note 52, at 93–95.
Id. at 39.
Id.
See MILLS, BLACK RIGHTS/WHITE WRONGS, supra note 52, at 63–64.
Id. at 63 (emphasis omitted).
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seemingly disconfirming, or at least problematic,
perceptions are filtered out or marginalized. In other words,
one will tend to find the confirmation in the world whether
it is there or not.89
Mills here draws our attention to research in cognitive psychology
revealing the limited potential of disconfirming information to alter
preconceptions,90 but he also implicitly raises the more disturbing
possibility that these hardwired cognitive limitations might
crystallize into ontological facts—that is, they might become
inscribed into the very social being for many Americans.
Importantly, Mills is careful to specify that what he calls “white
ignorance” is a tendential phenomenon, not a categorical one. He
“locates white miscognition as a structural phenomenon rather than a
matter of individual white myopias”; it is “the result (not
unavoidably, but as a strong psychological tendency) of racial
location” that causes “whites [to] tend to get certain kinds of things
wrong.”91 Furthermore, he clarifies that he is not suggesting that all
White Americans operate in this epistemological fog, or for that
matter that non-White Americans cannot also suffer from White
ignorance.92 As he uses it, the “White” descriptor captures the term’s
hierarchical salience in racialized societies and does not purport to
describe the cognitive or psychological attributes of any particular
individuals within those societies.
Mills is an analytic political philosopher, and his critique of racial
amnesia and White ignorance marshals concepts from that tradition,
such as the social contract, epistemology, cognition, and ontology. In
his 2015 book, Beneath the Surface of White Supremacy:
Denaturalizing U.S. Racisms Past and Present, Moon-Kie Jung

89. Id. at 60–61.
90. See, e.g., Lee Clarke, The Disqualification Heuristic: When Do Organizations Misperceive
Risk?, 5 RSCH. SOC. PROBS. & PUB. POL’Y 289, 289 (1993).
91. MILLS, BLACK RIGHTS/WHITE WRONGS, supra note 52, at xvii (emphasis added).
92. See id. at 57 (“[T]he ‘white’ in ‘white ignorance’ does not mean that it has to be confined to
white people. . . . Providing the causal route is appropriate, blacks can manifest white ignorance also.”).
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makes a similarly significant contribution to the literature on the
mnemonic effects of race ideology in the United States, but from the
sociological rather than a philosophical perspective. In particular,
Jung draws from the work of sociologists Pierre Bourdieu and
William Sewell.93
Jung argues that race and racism in America should be thought of
in terms of Sewell’s notion of “social structures.”94 For Sewell, social
structures refer to combinations of social schema and social
resources. Schemas refer to the binary oppositions that make up a
society’s conceptual tools, along with the “various conventions,
recipes, scenarios, principles of action, and habits of speech and
gesture built up with these fundamental tools.”95 Resources, on the
other hand, are the sources, material and immaterial, that “can be
used to enhance or maintain power.”96 Though to widely varying
degrees, structures tend to reproduce themselves because “resources
are the effect of schemas, and schemas are the effects of resources.
That is, schemas and resources are mutually sustaining.”97 In
Sewell’s formulation, social structures vary along two different
dimensions: depth and power.98 Most relevant for our purposes here
is the notion of “deep structures,”99 which refer to “schemas that can
be shown to underlie ordinary or ‘surface’ structures, in the sense that
the surface structures are a set of transformations of the deep

93. See generally MOON-KIE JUNG, BENEATH THE SURFACE OF WHITE SUPREMACY:
DENATURALIZING U.S. RACISMS PAST AND PRESENT (2015).
94. Id. Of course, the concept of structure is one of the key concepts of modern social theory, from
Marx to Bourdieu and Giddens. The point here is not that Sewell and Jung have invented a new
metatheoretical concept but rather that their elaboration of the structure concept is especially
illuminating in the study of American racism.
95. William H. Sewell, Jr., A Theory of Structure: Duality, Agency, and Transformation, 98 AM. J.
SOCIO. 1, 7–8 (1992) (referring to schemas as the “semiotic” dimension of social life).
96. Id. at 9.
97. JUNG, supra note 93, at 26.
98. Sewell, supra note 95, at 22.
99. Id. Sewell’s use of the term “power” is neither relevant for our purpose here, nor particularly
illuminating because, on this latter score, the concept simply appears to refer to the degree of intensity
of potential or actual recourse to resources, and because he also distractingly disregards the extensive
Foucauldian elaboration of the relationship between power and knowledge (a category that itself
overlaps with Sewell’s “schemas”). Id.
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structures.”100 As such, these “deep structural schemas are also
pervasive, in the sense that they are present in a relatively wide range
of institutional spheres, practices, and discourses.”101 Deep structural
schemas also operate most forcefully on the unconscious, in the sense
that they form part of the background, “taken-for-granted”
presuppositions that actors apply in ordinary social life without
taking account of them.102 In Habermasian terms, they are the
constituents of the lifeworld.103
Jung’s contribution to the analysis of American race amnesia
begins with his contention that racism denominates deep Sewellian
structures of domination based on the schema of race.104 Racism,
then, is the “vast web of unholy couplings,” practical articulations of
these schemas and resource flows that instantiate racial domination,
inequality, and hierarchy.105 Jung specifies that the depth of this
particular schematic technique—which, we will recall, refers to its
durability and its susceptibility to naturalization, and the
corresponding difficulty of “unthinking” it—is attributable to the
protean capacity of its schemas of suitability/unsuitability and
superiority/inferiority to reinvent themselves in historically specific
contexts.106 To study race in America, then, is to investigate the vast
web of racialized schemas saturating the American experience across
the entire range of social life, from healthcare to criminality and
morbidity, from education to employment and then to
unemployment, across family and church and sexuality and politics.
Jung contends that “most racist practices are enactments of tacit
schemas: largely taken for granted, the operative schemas that are
constitutive of utterances and other practices bypass, override, or

100. Id.
101. Id.
102. See id.
103. See supra text accompanying notes 41–44.
104. See JUNG, supra note 93, at 31–35. Jung defines “race” as the modern mode of differentiating
categories of persons for political purposes, according to shifting conceptions of putative hereditary
traits. See id. at 31.
105. Id. at 174.
106. See id. at 36.
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influence, to varying degrees, conscious calculation and
rationalization.”107 Racism is enacted and inscribed in White
ignorance, nourished more by these tacit schemas than by overt racist
ideology or conscious practice: “What is continually
underemphasized and misunderstood in the study of racism, and
other forms of domination, is the dominant’s massive ignorance.”108
But the ignorance Jung has in mind here is not the conscious refusal
to learn or the naïve failure to have already learned, but an
unconscious ignorance and acceptance of racially subordinating
structures.
On this point, Jung relies on Pierre Bourdieu’s notion of doxa,
which the latter uses to refer to the experience by which systems of
classification and other beliefs, configurations, exclusions, practices,
and conceptual frames secure tacit, unanimous, unconscious assent
on the part of social actors—by which they, in a paradoxical
formulation, “secur[e] the misrecognition, and hence the recognition,
of the arbitrariness on which [those systems of classification] are
based.”109 This theme of disguised arbitrariness pervades Bourdieu’s
work.
One of Bourdieu’s main themes was that tacit, taken-for-granted
beliefs (the realm of the doxa) play a much bigger role than
conscious decisions, much less inter-subjective discursive agreement,
in explaining human behavior.110 Of particular interest to both
Bourdieu and this discussion is the “doxic submission which attaches
us to the established order with all the ties of the unconscious,”111 as

107. Id. at 40.
108. Id. at 41.
109. PIERRE BOURDIEU, OUTLINE OF A THEORY OF PRACTICE 164 (Richard Nice trans., 1977).
Bourdieu’s use of doxa recalls Louis Althusser’s theorization of the interpellative function of
ideology—that is, the phenomenon by which individuals are “always, already” called (or
“interpellated”) into their subjectivity by rituals of ideological recognition. See LOUIS ALTHUSSER, THE
REPRODUCTION OF CAPITALISM: IDEOLOGY AND IDEOLOGICAL STATE APPARATUSES 189 (G.M.
Goshgarian trans., 2014).
110. See, e.g., PIERRE BOURDIEU & LOÏC J.D. WACQUANT, AN INVITATION TO REFLEXIVE
SOCIOLOGY 25 (1992).
111. Pierre Bourdieu, Rethinking the State: Genesis and Structure of the Bureaucratic Field, 12 SOC.
THEORY 1, 14 (1994).
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well as the reproduction of hierarchical systems of domination that
result, including those relating to race.112 In terms that resonate with
the earlier discussion of Hall, Rogin, and Mills,113 Bourdieu describes
how unconscious, doxic structures of thought impose a “genesis
amnesia”—a “forgetting of history which history itself produces by
incorporating the objective structures [of a society] in [our] second
natures.”114 Doxa describes how agents’ subjective aspirations tend
to converge or become identical with the established order,
naturalizing and disguising the ineradicable arbitrariness of the latter
in the process.115
Wherever doxa operates, it exerts a symbolic violence, delimiting
the range of possible actions, discourse, and outcomes for social
actors, always in the context of a hierarchical dominant/dominated
scheme.116 Bourdieu illustrates the concept while analyzing some of
James Baldwin’s reflections on the psychological experience of
Black American youth apprehending, not yet consciously, the weight
of American mid-twentieth century racism:
Symbolic violence is the coercion which is set up only
through the consent that the dominated cannot fail to give
to the dominator (and therefore to the domination) when
their understanding of the situation and relation can only
use instruments of knowledge that they have in common
with the dominator, which, being merely the incorporated
form of the structure of the relation of domination, make
this relation appear as natural; or, in other words, when the
schemes they implement in order to perceive and evaluate
112. BOURDIEU, supra note 109, at 183–97; see also TERRY EAGLETON, IDEOLOGY: AN
INTRODUCTION 157 (new ed. 2007) (discussing importance of domination as a driving force in imposing
doxic structures of belief).
113. See supra text accompanying notes 75–89.
114. BOURDIEU, supra note 109, at 78–79.
115. See id. at 164–68.
116. See Bourdieu, supra note 111, at 3–4 (noting how a social actor uses symbolic violence to
“incarnate[] itself simultaneously in objectivity, in the form of specific organizational structures and
mechanisms, and in subjectivity in the form of mental structures and categories of perception and
thought”).
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themselves or to perceive and evaluate the dominators
(high/low, male/female, white/black, etc.) are the product
of the incorporation of the (thus naturalized) classifications
of which their social being is the product.117
On the other hand, those occupying privileged social positions
internalize and reproduce the social structures (in the form of
rationalizations, myths, and imagery) from which they benefit.118 In
the end, Bourdieu’s social theory simply leaves comparatively little
space for the sort of rationalistic, discursive resolution of
disagreements, making the marshalling of disparity data to illuminate
the radically disparate material experiences and opinions of Black
people rather pointless.
Jung’s important contribution is to apply the Bourdieusian
concepts of doxa and symbolic violence to racism and white
supremacy in the United States. He elaborates two complementary
forms of symbolic violence in service of doxic ignorance, which he
labels symbolic coercion and symbolic perversity.119 Even if one can
quibble with the somewhat opaque terminology, the concepts move
beyond Bourdieu’s basic schema in ways that advance analysis of
race (and racial disparity) discourse. Importantly, the phenomena
denoted by these concepts will handicap any efforts to use racial
disparity data to achieve a rationalistic consensus on matters of race.

117. PIERRE BOURDIEU, PASCALIAN MEDITATIONS 170 (Richard Nice trans., Stanford Univ. Press
2000). Here, in 1997, Bourdieu is discussing Baldwin’s famous 1962 essay, The Fire Next Time, which
furnished the conceit (a letter to one’s younger relative about the horrors of American racism) that
Ta-Nehisi Coates more recently used in his acclaimed 2015 title Between the World and Me. Bourdieu
published his first systematic formulation of the notions of symbolic power, doxa, habitus, and field in
1972 under the title Outline of a Theory of Practice. See generally BOURDIEU, supra note 109. In that
book, he discussed social domination extensively, but without mentioning racial subordination, instead
focusing on sex and class domination. Id. at 183. By the end of his career and life, he had obviously
begun to appreciate how racial domination was a setting to which his concepts had direct application.
118. See ROGERS BRUBAKER, GROUNDS FOR DIFFERENCE 38 (2015) (discussing Bourdieu’s concept
of symbolic violence). This process, which involves members of dominant groups adjusting their
expectations and aspirations to their opportunities and internalizing schemas of classification,
perception, and evaluation that systematically valorize their own dominant positions, is a theoretical
frame within which to situate much of the ubiquitous, but undertheorized, talk of “white privilege.” Id.
119. See generally JUNG, supra note 93.
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Symbolic coercion describes the phenomenon by which dominant
actors are unable to consciously recognize arguments originating in
dominated, subaltern classes and populations of society that seek to
challenge deeply held, structural beliefs about hierarchy.120 If
symbolic violence generally designates the unconscious assent of
both the dominant and the dominated to the established social order,
symbolic coercion, according to Jung, denotes a specific context in
which symbolic violence occurs: the “conscious disagreement of the
dominated that goes unconsciously unrecognized by the
dominant.”121 The concept gives theoretical context to the frequent
complaints of subordinated groups that they feel “voiceless” and
“vulnerable” vis-à-vis dominant social strata distinguished by racial
position or other possession of social or financial capital. Those
populating subordinated social strata—which, in the United States,
refers to poor Black and indigenous people more than anyone else—
are not only subjected to arbitrary physical and economic violence,
they are also subjected to the coercive symbolic violence that
legitimates police brutality, social welfare retrenchment, public
services divestment, discrimination in financial services, and
unemployment—and everything else supported by ideological
concepts ranging from “colorblindness” and “underclass culture”122
to credit scoring and “broken windows” policing—by disregarding
any critiques of those institutional forms.
Bourdieu anticipated Jung’s concept of symbolic coercion, albeit
obliquely. He noted that if subaltern, heterodox groups seek to
rupture matters of doxic consensus, they should expect that, in
response to any success they have, the dominant relations will
respond by converting one form of capital (financial, usually) into
another form of capital (social, usually), through, for example,

120. Id.
121. Id. at 121.
122. On the underclass myth, see generally Adolph Reed, Jr., The Underclass Myth, in CLASS NOTES:
POSING AS POLITICS AND OTHER THOUGHTS ON THE AMERICAN SCENE 93 (2000).
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donations to foundations and research institutions.123 Or they might
determine, as Jamie Dimon did, that it is easier to just take a knee.124
Symbolic perversity, like symbolic coercion, refers to a type of
ignorance on the part of dominant social actors, but here the
discourse that is occluded is not that of the dominated, but that of the
dominant themselves. Put in terms of race:
[T]he dominant, whether they be institutions or individuals,
are typically well aware of many persistent racial
inequalities, beyond those politicized and brought to their
attention by subaltern discourses. The dominant possess
discursive knowledge of the reality that certain racial
[categories] of actors systematically fare worse than
themselves and others. Much of this knowledge is produced
by dominant institutions, like state agencies, research
universities, and news media. Yet the dominant’s
consumption and circulation of this knowledge are
censored and structured by an underlying racial logic that
implicitly assumes radical difference between categories of
people and renders the suffering of some incommensurable
with and less worthy than the suffering of others. They can
and do know about the suffering of their racial others, but
this knowledge fails to register or matter . . . . The effect of
this knowing–unknowing is depraved indifference to racial
inequalities—depraved for its knowingness but indifferent
in usually unknowing, unreflective ways.125
This knowing–unknowing echoes Bourdieu’s description of the
paradoxical nature of doxa: that it simultaneously secures the
misrecognition, and hence the recognition, of the arbitrariness on
which systems of classification, and therefore systems of domination,

123. See BOURDIEU, supra note 109, at 196–97.
124. See supra text accompanying note 26.
125. JUNG, supra note 93, at 143 (emphasis added).
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rest.126 Through the notions of symbolic coercion (with its focus on
tacit nonrecognition of dominated discourse) and symbolic perversity
(with its focus on tacit nonrecognition of discourse produced by
dominant social actors), Jung explains how the established and
dominant institutions of American society struggle to meaningfully
redress racial disparity, even where those very same institutions are
the sites of production for the evidence of disparity.127 To be sure,
Bourdieu and Jung are not making descriptive generalizations about
the subjective intentions or cognitive capacities of individual people;
instead, they are shedding light on the ways that individual agency
and intentional action are unavoidably mediated by a classificatory,
schematic social structure in which, as Jung documents, race plays an
important organizing role.
These authors caution us against setting our expectations too high
when it comes to using disparity discourse in conversations with
dominant racial incumbents.128 On the one hand, we might imagine
that continuing to draw attention to historical and empirical data
concerning racially disparate treatment and outcomes might change
the doxa itself,129 and thereby clear the way for transformed
schema-resource combinations in matters related to race. In Mills’s
formulation, such a strategy naïvely ignores that White ignorance is
White ignorance, a largely one-sided ignorance, the maintenance of
which inures exclusively to the benefit of the dominant, ruling
group.130 Jung and Bourdieu are even more direct about the
importance of dominant interests as creators of the established

126. See id.; see also supra text accompanying note 109.
127. JUNG, supra note 93, at 143.
128. Id.; MILLS, THE RACIAL CONTRACT, supra note 52, at 47.
129. Such a strategic orientation would resonate with Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri’s theorization
of the “multitude” that, by engaging in spontaneous micro-struggles, might catalyze new social
subjectivities that can organize themselves effectively, create lasting institutions, and eventually
transform social relations not predicated on dominance. See MICHAEL HARDT & ANTONIO NEGRI,
ASSEMBLY 328 (2017) [hereinafter HARDT & NEGRI, ASSEMBLY ]; MICHAEL HARDT & ANTONIO NEGRI,
MULTITUDE: WAR AND DEMOCRACY IN THE AGE OF EMPIRE 66, 81 (2004) [hereinafter HARDT &
NEGRI, MULTITUDE]. Hardt and Negri conceptualize mobilizations of the multitude as struggles against
doxa, expressly invoking Bourdieu. See HARDT & NEGRI, ASSEMBLY, supra, at 258.
130. See MILLS, THE RACIAL CONTRACT, supra note 52, at 39–40.
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common sense.131 Doxa is not just a particular point of view; it is the
point of view of the dominant that establishes itself as universal,
legitimating the established social order.132 Racial disparities are
perceived by dominant racial groups to ratify the naturalized social
order responsible for their creation and reproduction—hence
Bourdieu’s concept of “genesis amnesia,” discussed above.133
On the other hand, we might imagine that shedding light on racial
disparities will clear the way for rationalistic consensus among Black
and White individuals. This second objective is, at first blush, more
credible, and for that reason, its likely failure is more frustrating,
even tragic. Even if the initial attempts to achieve rough consensus
fall short because of Dawson’s point about the present lack of shared
lifeworld consensus,134 perhaps continued discursive engagement can
forge lifeworld understandings on the basis of which future
consensus might be achieved. The aim would be to disturb and
expose the arbitrariness of the unconscious, doxic, amnesiac beliefs
and schemas concerning superiority and inferiority that underwrite
much of what passes for common sense on matters related to race,
including the naturalization of disparate outcomes. Some antiracists
hold out hope for such a mutual understanding in spite of the
pervasive and deep dimensions of White collective forgetting.
For instance, Thomas McCarthy, a Habermasian critical theorist,
has proposed a new “politics of memory” through a systematic
dedication, including through reparations, to bridging the “peculiar
gap” between historical scholarship and lay understanding of the
significance of race in U.S. history as well as present reality.135
However, Mills and Jung warn us not to underestimate the cognitive
embeddedness of racial schemas reproduced by the doxa and its

131. See BOURDIEU, supra note 109, at 169.
132. See Bourdieu, supra note 111, at 15.
133. See supra text accompanying note 114.
134. See supra text accompanying note 51.
135. See Thomas McCarthy, Vergangenheitsbewältigung in the USA: On the Politics of the Memory
of Slavery, 30 POL. THEORY 623, 624 (2002) (modeling his proposal on the German response to the
Holocaust).
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accompanying symbolic violence.136 If they are even partially
correct, many White Americans will (and do) struggle to understand
the world their ancestors made and they themselves reproduce.137
Perhaps, when it comes to matters of race, the real contribution of
Habermas and the discourse theorists is not to provide us a practical
roadmap for establishing a new, discursively grounded consensus on
race and racism, but to implicitly demonstrate the wide, possibly
unbridgeable gulf between extant psychological and imaginative
capacities for many Americans and the real, solidaristic conditions of
possibility for a political solution grounded in rational discourse.138
IV. SO, WHAT SHOULD WE DO WITH DISPARITY DISCOURSE?
If Mills and Jung are roughly correct in their diagnosis of the
problem, then two things become clear. First, antiracist politics and
practice, including discussion of racial disparities, should not be
conceptualized predominantly, if at all, as a rationalistic project to
convince White people of anything.139 Devoting attentional and
financial resources to organizing discursive spaces and exposing
implicit biases will likely not be the most effective strategy for an
emancipatory politics. Moreover, doing so risks cementing liberal
ideological conceits that, for instance, conceptualize racism as an
individual psychological demerit isolated from the dominant political
economy and established social order.140 Second, as a correlate,
antiracists must search for a new model for oppositional politics,
unanchored to rationalistic discourse theory. However, Mills and

136. See generally JUNG, supra note 93; MILLS, THE RACIAL CONTRACT, supra note 52.
137. See supra text accompanying note 77.
138. See supra text accompanying note 46 (discussing the importance of solidarity to discourse
theory).
139. Of course, throughout history, some members of dominant groups have contributed to struggles
of dominated groups. The point here is not about individual action as much as it is about the general
orientation of political programs. See also text accompanying notes 91 and 92 (describing how Mills
himself specifies that White ignorance is neither confined to White people nor meant to refer to all
White people).
140. See supra text accompanying notes 60–66.
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Jung only provide a few preliminary signposts for how to think about
this project.
Mills and Jung (along with Bourdieu) are vulnerable to the critique
that their theories suggest that racial domination has congealed into
an ontological structure that deterministically forecloses any agency
for those committed to extirpating race thinking.141 To that extent,
their perspectives might invite comparisons with Afropessimist
accounts that see the dominant White society not so much as
cognitively limited by its own self-imposed ideological apparatus as
essentially and primally rooted in violence against and
dehumanization of African-descended peoples.142 Adolph Reed
criticizes this position as an “idealist mystification that posits a
primordial white racism or a transhistorical, reified White Supremacy
capable of acting in the world.”143 Ultimately, Jung and Mills might
flirt with this sort of pessimism, but they distance themselves at the
last instance.144 Their important contribution to highlight the doxic
(and toxic) structures of racism, as well as their cognitive and
epistemological effects on White American, prompts a question they
ultimately do not yet answer satisfactorily.
Since leveling his critique of the epistemology of White ignorance
in The Racial Contract, Mills has more recently argued in Black
Rights/White Wrongs: The Critique of Racial Liberalism that “[o]nly
by starting to break these rules and meta-rules can we begin the long
process that will lead back to the eventual overcoming of this white
darkness and the achievement of an enlightenment that is genuinely
141. See generally JUNG, supra note 93; MILLS, THE RACIAL CONTRACT, supra note 52.
142. See FRANK B. WILDERSON III, AFROPESSIMISM 15 (2020) (“Blacks are not Human subjects, but
are instead structurally inert props, implements for the execution of White and non-Black fantasies and
sadomasochistic pleasures . . . .”); Frank Wilderson, III, Gramsci’s Black Marx: Whither the Slave in
Civil Society, 9 SOC. IDENTITIES 225, 239 n.1 (2003) (arguing that the “constituent elements of civil
society are . . . anti-black”).
143. Adolph Reed, Jr., What Materialist Black Political History Actually Looks Like, NONSITE.ORG
(Jan.
8,
2019),
https://nonsite.org/what-materialist-black-political-history-actually-looks-like/
[https://perma.cc/86BK-EQSE]; see also Michael C. Dawson, Hidden in Plain Sight: A Note on
Legitimation Crises and the Racial Order, 3 CRITICAL HIST. STUD. 143, 157–59 (2016) (criticizing
Afropessimistic accounts that posit a reified white supremacy isolated from the evolving political
economy).
144. See generally JUNG, supra note 93; MILLS, THE RACIAL CONTRACT, supra note 52.
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multiracial.”145 In that latter book, which in the main restates his
“racial contract” thesis in the context of a broader critique of
liberalism, he sketches out in the epilogue an undeveloped
placeholder concept of radical Black liberalism.146 This project, as he
briefly describes it there, would synthesize Kant, Marx, and Du Bois
in developing a notion of free development of individuals (Kant),
unencumbered by capitalist exploitation (Marx), and emancipated
from race thinking altogether (Du Bois).147
To be sure, he specifies that his radical Black liberalism is, as of
now, just an outline, but in responding to a “Can this work?” query,
he can only manage to say: “There are no guarantees, but then no
other competing ideology can offer them either.”148 All he can say,
for now at least, is that radical Black liberalism is a materialist
perspective that does not place its hopes for social transformation on
moral suasion and rationalist discourse, but on the mobilization of
group interests.149 Mills, at least in this preliminary exposition of this
new political concept, provides us little guidance about how to
marshal disparity data and moral arguments to contribute to this
broader materialist politics.150 This is hardly surprising, given that so
much of his argument concerns the ideological baggage obfuscating
and conditioning the perception of interests, especially for White
Americans. This political terrain—marrying a materialist,
programmatic, and pragmatic commitment to movement building
with an honest encounter with race thinking and racism—is a thorny
nettle.151
Jung, for his part, is ultimately able to locate a historical subject in
the struggle to achieve an emancipatory antiracism: people of color
themselves. If racism is structural in the Bourdieusian/Sewellian
145. See MILLS, BLACK RIGHTS/WHITE WRONGS, supra note 52, at 71.
146. See id.
147. See id. at 203–04.
148. Id. at 206.
149. See id.
150. See id.
151. See generally KAREN E. FIELDS & BARBARA J. FIELDS, RACECRAFT: THE SOUL OF INEQUALITY
IN AMERICAN LIFE (2014).
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sense, then emancipatory politics must aim to disrupt that structure,
and people of color are the only possible agent with the capacity to
do so:
[A]ntiracism demands efforts to transform, more or less
radically, the structure in question. At whatever scale, it is
about disrupting racism’s smooth reproduction, the routine
articulation of its schemas and resources. Who is to
perform such acts of subversion? If the distribution of
critical knowledge is inversely related to hierarchies of
power and the distribution of ignorance, as I contend, the
struggle against white supremacy, as in the past, will be led
by people of color. This is not to say that whites cannot and
will not join the fight, but it is less likely. It is harder for
them to access and accept critical knowledge that is, on the
whole, foreign to or at odds with their habitus and even
harder to put into practice . . . .152
In short, antiracists should not wait for an accumulation of
epiphanic moments on the part of White Americans to disrupt the
deep structure of racism in the United States. That much is, I think,
inarguably true.
Still, his roadmap is no clearer than that of Mills, consisting of a
few references to “disruptive, often unlawful, acts” and “acts of
disobedience.”153 He borrows from Asef Bayat’s conceptualization of
“social nonmovements” that, when met with repression, can turn into
bona fide social movements.154 The example from Bayat’s book that
he cites as an example of success in that arena—the 2006 “Gran
Marcha” migrant protests—only underscores the need for a fuller

152. JUNG, supra note 93, at 177–78.
153. Id. at 178.
154. See id. at 179. On this point, Jung misses an opportunity to engage with Hardt and Negri’s work
on the emancipatory energy contained in the dispersed but coordinated networks of cooperative
relationships that pervade contemporary social life. See HARDT & NEGRI, ASSEMBLY, supra note 129, at
21.
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account of the agency of subordinated racial groups.155 Although the
protests were an impressive demonstration of solidarity and a call for
action, at this conjuncture it seems an exaggeration to suggest that
they contributed to a durable political movement up to the task of
altering the structures that underwrite anti-immigrant racism in the
United States.
In borrowing from Bourdieu, Jung makes himself susceptible to a
frequent criticism of Bourdieu: that his contributions to social theory
emphasize reproduction and continuity to such a degree that they fail
to account for ruptures and creativity, and that his concepts of
habitus, field, and doxa unduly constrict the space for political
agency.156 Although these criticisms of Bourdieu are contestable,157 it
is unsurprising that Jung, having leaned so heavily on Bourdieu,
arguably finds himself in the same position.
Nevertheless, Jung’s specification that people of color will lead the
struggle against White supremacy is a helpful starting point to
imagine a way forward. Dawson’s survey research demonstrates a
“substantial potential for mobilization to progressive causes within
most black communities.”158 Much of his recent work documents
how radical tendencies in Black politics became integrated into the
existing social order, dissipating their once-powerful energies.159
This story, as Dawson recounts it, is a complex one, involving the
integration of many Black elites into the existing political and
economic order, an uncritical and antidemocratic embrace of Maoism
among radical contingents of 1960s and 1970s Black nationalists,
consistent and pervasive anti-Black racism within putatively mass
155. See ASEF BAYAT, LIFE AS POLITICS: HOW ORDINARY PEOPLE CHANGE THE MIDDLE EAST 24–
25 (2d ed. 2013).
156. See, e.g., David Swartz, Pierre Bourdieu, in F IFTY KEY SOCIOLOGISTS: THE CONTEMPORARY
THEORISTS 39, 44–45 (John Scott ed., 2007); WILLIAM H. SEWELL, JR., LOGICS OF HISTORY: SOCIAL
THEORY AND SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION 139 (2005).
157. See generally Johan Heilbron & George Steinmetz, A Defense of Bourdieu, 2 CATALYST 35
(2018); PIERRE BOURDIEU, Social Scientists, Economic Science and the Social Movement, in ACTS OF
RESISTANCE: AGAINST THE NEW MYTHS OF OUR TIME 52 (Richard Nice trans., 1998) (demonstrating
Bourdieu’s firm political commitments and solidarity with social movements).
158. DAWSON, supra note 24, at 11.
159. Id.
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leftist parties throughout the twentieth century, and the ravaging
effects of deep poverty, unemployment, and precarity among large
segments of the Black population during the neoliberal era.160 The
result is that today “blacks no longer have anywhere near the
ideological resources they had during the last century for productive
utopian thinking and debate.”161
However, Dawson also highlights the potential for disparity
discourse to help galvanize a new radical, vanguard Black politics:
[T]he wide range of substantial racial and socioeconomic
disparities still to be found in health care, crime and
punishment, and a host of other areas of life . . . provide the
foundation for the continuing radical edge to black public
opinion. There is still a need for a militant wing of black
politics to address these disadvantages, as it has become
clear over the past three decades that those engaged in
“mainstream” politics have proven insufficient to bring
about the fundamental change needed to address these
problems, and perhaps are uninterested in doing so.162
Nikhil Singh, in his 2004 book Black Is a Country, makes a similar
call for redevelopment of the Black subaltern counterpublic.163
Again, this project should not be primarily conceptualized as a
rationalistic, discursive politics. To do so is to invite ineffectualness

160. See id. passim. See generally Michael Dawson, 3 of 10 Theses on Neoliberalism in the U.S.
During the Early 21st Century, 6 CARCERAL NOTEBOOKS 11 (2010).
161. DAWSON, supra note 24, at 186. Dawson described the Black political landscape in these terms
in 2013, and it is fair to wonder if he would temper this assessment somewhat today, following the 2020
protests and the election of two Black socialists to Congress. See Maurice Isserman, Congress Now Has
More Socialists Than Ever Before in U.S. History, IN THESE TIMES (Jan. 11, 2021),
https://inthesetimes.com/article/democratic-socialism-dsa-aoc-bernie-sanders-congress
[https://perma.cc/6J4L-NN6H] (reporting on the November 2020 elections of Congresspersons Cori
Bush and Jamaal Bowman, both members of the Democratic Socialists of America); cf. FUTURES OF
BLACK RADICALISM (Gaye Theresa Johnson & Alex Lubin eds., 2017) (collecting essays organized
around the theme of renewed engagement with the history of Black radical movements and thought).
162. DAWSON, supra note 24, at 16.
163. SINGH, supra note 17, at 224.
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and co-optation and, ultimately, to further cement the established
order, including its racialized dominance hierarchies.
To be clear, the argument is hardly that we should reject discourse
theory, much less Habermasian social theory. Instead, the argument
is that its model of discursive rationality among coequal participants
sharing a lifeworld and solidaristic relations is not the best political
vector to proceed along in this domain. However, it will not do to
simply reject discourse; we need to come up with something else.
V. CHANTAL MOUFFE’S “AGONISTIC PLURALISM” AS AN
ALTERNATIVE TO DISCOURSE THEORY
Chantal Mouffe’s theorization of politics as “agonistic
pluralism”164 provides a more promising framework within which to
think about the ongoing efforts to build this vanguard radical Black
politics. Her concept foregrounds inter-group, pluralistic struggle,
and defines itself in large part against the rationalistic discourse
theory of Habermas (Mouffe prefers the term “agonistic” over
“antagonistic” because the latter, she argues, denotes a relationship
between enemies, whereas the former denotes a relationship of
adversaries or rivals for power desiring to organize their shared
“symbolic space” in different ways).165
For Mouffe, political theory during the post-war period largely
settled on an aggregative model of liberal democracy that grew out of
liberal commitments to individualism and a strict conceptual divide
between a private life where preferences were forged (in
neighborhoods, churches, trade unions, families, fraternal
organizations, and the like) and a public life where those preferences
were weighed in the market for votes and policy.166 Aggregative
pluralist democracy’s solution to the problem of social order and
integration was to view public life, then, solely as a place of

164. See MOUFFE, supra note 44, at 80–107.
165. Id. at 13.
166. Id. at 81–83.
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compromise among interest groups, deprived of any normative
content.167 Power differentials, including those residing along the
deep social fault lines attributable to racism, dropped out of this
picture altogether, except insofar as they expressed themselves in the
struggle for political and economic power—as the result of “simple
competition among interests taking place in a neutral terrain.”168
Theories of a deliberative, rationalistic, discursive model of liberal
democracy—the most important of which were those of Habermas
and Rawls—arose in response to the perceived failures of this
aggregative model to establish a credible normative underpinning and
to stabilize the economy and broader society.169 These theories
sought to imagine the conditions of possibility for a consensus that
depended not on aggregating, via markets and brokerage politics,
preferences formed antecedently in a purely private realm, but on
deliberative forms of association predicated on equality rather than
exclusion and power.
Mouffe shares the rationalist discourse theorists’ concern that the
aggregative model mystifies and obscures questions of power,
exclusion, and inequality. But to her, rationalistic social theory
performs a similar move, hiding the irreducible dimension of
antagonism inherent in human relations in an idealized concept of
“discourse.”170 Her agonistic model of politics centers around
conflicts over power, rather than discourse:
167. Id. at 82. Mouffe assigns pride of place to Joseph Schumpeter and Anthony Downs, but other
important figures include political pluralists like Robert Dahl, David Truman, Earl Latham, and Ted
Lowi, as well as the “neopluralist” economists who formalized and translated the political pluralists’
insights into the language of economics, such as Gary Becker. For an overview of political pluralism,
see Steven P. Croley, Theories of Regulation: Incorporating the Administrative Process, 98 COLUM. L.
REV. 1, 31–32 (1998); and Robert B. Reich, Public Administration and Public Deliberation: An
Interpretive Essay, 94 YALE L.J. 1617 (1985).
168. ERNESTO LACLAU & CHANTAL MOUFFE, HEGEMONY AND SOCIALIST STRATEGY: TOWARDS A
RADICAL DEMOCRATIC POLITICS, at xvi (2d ed. 2001).
169. This is especially true of Habermas. One of his signal contributions to social theory in the 1970s
was to show how the welfare statism that superintended this aggregative politics during the postwar
period had entered a legitimation crisis as “new Keynesian” fantasies of state management of the
economy for the benefit of all social classes collapsed. See generally JÜRGEN HABERMAS,
LEGITIMATION CRISIS (Thomas McCarthy trans., 1975).
170. MOUFFE, supra note 44, at 101. To be fair, Habermas and Benhabib recognize that the “ideal
speech situation” underlying their discourse theory of communicative rationality is a counterfactually
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[A] non-exclusive public sphere of rational argument is a
conceptual impossibility. Conflict and division . . . are
neither disturbances that unfortunately cannot be eliminated
nor empirical impediments that render impossible the full
realization of a harmony that we cannot attain because we
will never be able to leave our particularities completely
aside in order to act in accordance with our rational
self . . . . Indeed, we maintain that without conflict and
division, a pluralist democratic politics would be
impossible.171
In fact, any temporary semblance of consensus is the result of a
provisional hegemony functioning to stabilize power relations.
Although the terminology is different,172 Mouffe’s concept of
hegemony is a close conceptual cognate of Bourdieu’s doxa and
symbolic violence.173 “Social division,” far from being able to be
reined in by rationalistic politics, “is inherent in the possibility of
politics, and . . . in the very possibility of democratic politics.”174 In
contemporary liberal societies, there is always an “ineradicable
pluralism of value,” a basal antagonism that cannot be rationalized
away through discourse or anything else.175 And, importantly, “[n]o
amount of dialogue and moral preaching will ever convince the
ruling class to give up its power.”176
If we accept that pluralistic power struggle, rather than discourse,
is the substance of politics, then the main question is not how to
eliminate power relations and exclusion through realization of
posited and idealized thought experiment that, although possessing normative force, does not refer to
concrete societies situated in space, time, and history. See HABERMAS, supra note 43, at 323–24;
BENHABIB, supra note 39, at 285–86.
171. LACLAU & MOUFFE, supra note 168, at xvii.
172. MOUFFE, supra note 44, at 21. Mouffe grows out of a Marxian tradition from which Bourdieu
sought to distance himself. See Mathieu Hikaru Desan, Bourdieu, Marx, and Capital: A Critique of the
Extension Model, 31 SOCIO. THEORY 318, 318 (2013).
173. See EAGLETON, supra note 112, at 158.
174. LACLAU & MOUFFE, supra note 168, at xiv.
175. MOUFFE, supra note 44, at 102; see also ERNESTO LACLAU, ON POPULIST REASON 169 (2005).
176. MOUFFE, supra note 44, at 15.
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rational consensus, but how to constitute new forms of power that are
more consistent with democratic values in a pluralistic world divided
by class, race, and so forth.177 Ultimately, the goal of politics is to
confront and convert, not to convince.178 The goal is to usher in a
new hegemonic articulation that looks neither to preference
aggregation nor to rationalistic discourse, but to a democratic logic
based on a “chain of equivalence” that links together struggles
against all forms of subordination and domination.179
In Mouffe’s estimation, inequality—that perennial preoccupation
of left politics180—must be the backbone of an attempt to articulate
and establish a new hegemonic phase of liberal democracy; further, it
must take account of the multiplicity of social relations in which
inequality requires a forceful challenge.181 There is no more powerful
primary material for this agonistic politics than the experience of
real, material exclusion and subordination within a dominant social
formation, which brings us to the present conjuncture of American
politics.
Mouffe’s agonistic pluralism offers a much better chance than
discourse theory to potentially destabilize the doxic consensus of the
range of possibilities for organizing social relations, including those
thematized around race.182 But such a project must be ambitious; if
we even partially accept the force of the arguments of Bourdieu,
177. See id. at 100.
178. See id. at 102.
179. LACLAU & MOUFFE, supra note 168, at xviii; see also PHILIP PETTIT, REPUBLICANISM: A
THEORY OF FREEDOM AND GOVERNMENT 67 (1997) (asking “[h]ow might we enable a person who is
danger of being dominated to achieve non-domination?”). This concept of the “chain of equivalence”
complements Martha Fineman’s “vulnerability” theory. See generally Martha Albertson Fineman, The
Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring Equality in the Human Condition, 20 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1 (2008)
(theorizing a new “vulnerable subject” concept, defined in relation to the universal and constant
experience of human vulnerability, on which to build a new approach to social policy and law).
Fineman’s vulnerability thesis could be thought of as a micro-foundation for Mouffe’s macro-theory of
agonistic pluralism. See id.
180. See NORBERTO BOBBIO, LEFT AND RIGHT: THE SIGNIFICANCE OF A POLITICAL DISTINCTION 71
(Allan Cameron trans., 1996).
181. See MOUFFE, supra note 44, at 123.
182. See LACLAU & MOUFFE, supra note 168, at xi; Fuyuki Kurasawa, An Alternative Transnational
Public Sphere? On Anarchist Cosmopolitanism in Post-Westphalian Times, in TRANSNATIONALIZING
THE PUBLIC SPHERE 79, 93 (Kate Nash ed., 2014).
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Jung, and Mills, any effort to denaturalize and demystify the social
and psychological consciousness of race in America today will
require the affirmative articulation of a new hegemonic vision.
In this connection, Stuart Hall made two observations in the late
1980s that today’s antiracists and progressives would do well to
remember: first, politics does not reflect majorities—it constructs
them; and second, modern electorates do not think in terms of
policies, but in terms of images.183 Politics constructs majorities in a
very precise manner, by bringing together multiple and
heterogenous—Mouffe would say “agonistically plural”—groups,
with different social positions and different material interests, to form
a social bloc.184 The social bloc that goes on to express itself
electorally as a political majority—and hopefully through even
stabler institutional forms that sustain the always provisional and
partial unity of the bloc—is forged ideologically through its
participants’ adherence to a type of political imagery about the
concept of citizenship—the type of person who is valued, the type of
activities that are valued, and the type of politics that demands
representation.
How can racial disparity discourse contribute to an agonistic
politics focused on forming and solidifying a new solidaristic social
bloc committed to democratizing social relations and eliminating
subordination and exploitation on grounds of race and otherwise—a
politics unfocused on, if not entirely indifferent to, the prospect of
consensus with White Americans? What use is disparity discourse in
a world where one of the main enemies is White supremacy, but
convincing White people is not really on the table in any meaningful
way? The house is offering low odds for a White law professor being
the one to light the way, and I hardly aim to do so here. Nevertheless,
in the following material, I offer some impressionistic suggestions

183. HALL, supra note 78, at 238, 246.
184. See supra text accompanying notes 164–179.
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and recommended reading for those interested in the case for a new
radical and agonistic politics of race.185
VI. ON THE “REAL UTOPIA” OF A REINVIGORATED, RADICAL, AND
AGONISTIC BLACK POLITICS
If Dawson is correct about the latent potential of a reinvigorated,
radical, Black political vanguard, then implications follow for the
deployment of disparity data. As an initial matter, our expectations
for disparity discourse will require us to be mindful of the audience.
The political use of disparity data today appears to be largely
predicated on an effort to convince White people (and other people
situated in dominant social strata) of a reality that is, and always has
been, manifestly before their eyes. In a world where the goal is to
convince a White audience, it might make sense to marshal the
disparity data to shed light on the lived reality that Black and White
Americans tend to have different relationships to the concepts of
opportunity, on the one hand, and depredation and precarity, on the
other. The problem is, as Mills and Jung point out, shedding light
only works if we can credibly expect the other person to see.186
On the other hand, if we conceive of the relevant task as the
deployment of disparity data before a predominantly non-White
audience to catalyze the development of the new radical politics that
Dawson advocates, the implications change dramatically.187 Black
Americans already possess sophisticated and nuanced understandings
of the pervasive racial disparities in most domains of contemporary
American social life.188 Consequently, the case for deploying
disparity data in the context of a reinvigorated oppositional Black
politics requires further specification. It becomes at first more
opaque, but in clarifying it, we sharpen its political usefulness
significantly. The point is not to ignore the serious problems of racial
185.
186.
187.
188.

See infra Part VI.
See JUNG, supra note 93, at 176.
DAWSON, supra note 24, at 204–06.
See Smith & King, supra note 12.
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disparities but to actualize a politics that starts from the assumption
that such pervasive disparities exist—indeed, that they are the
primary motivation for that politics. It is important to focus on three
such implications.
The first implication is straightforward and uncontroversial. In this
context, disparity data can serve as agenda-setting signposts,
directing attentional and financial resources to concrete political
programs. To adapt Adorno’s maxim discussed earlier, the disparities
testifying to the greatest “woe” should be the first to which
attentional and material resources should “go.”189
Second, a radical, oppositional political program confronting racial
disparities will focus more on articulating forceful public demands
for institutional reform—prison and death penalty abolition, cessation
of surveillance, an end to imperialist wars, greater democratic control
of state provisioning at all levels of government, infrastructure
investments, demilitarization of police, universal healthcare, job
guarantees, reparations, and the like. Different organized
collectivities with different degrees of militancy and different
priorities will advocate for different goals, but the crucial point is that
an agonistic, radical politics opens with a demand and an expectation,
not an argument. As Mouffe phrases it, the aim is to confront and
convert, not to convince.190 Or, if the reader prefers Du Bois, it is not
enough to simply tell people the truth; what is required is to act on
the truth.191 Of course, compromises and explanations are to be
expected, but are not the focus or emphasis of such a politics.
The third implication is arguably the most important. By
dispensing with the need to convince anyone that racial disparities
are real social facts that require redress, a radical approach to
disparity data can move on to the more important task of
investigating, publicizing, and organizing around the political–

189. See supra text accompanying note 13 (discussing Adorno’s “[w]oe speaks: ‘[g]o’” quip in the
context of racial disparity).
190. See supra text accompanying note 178.
191. See supra text accompanying note 2.
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economic factors responsible for reproducing the disparities.192 The
word “radical” does not only mean “extreme”; it also means, true to
its etymological Latin source radix, “of, relating to, or proceeding
from a root.”193 A politics deserves the name radical when it
commits itself to uncovering the root causes of social problems in the
neoliberal political economy, deracinating those root causes and
rooting new institutions in their place. Robin Kelley describes just
this sort of project: “We must go to the root—the historical, social,
cultural, ideological, material, economic root—of oppression in order
to understand its negation, the prospect of our liberation.”194 A
disparity is always the result of some network of underlying causes,
and a radical approach to politics will aim to situate disparity data in
the context of the ongoing evolution of regimes of hierarchy, rather
than with metaphysical, hypostatized placeholder concepts like
“systemic racism.”195
To be sure, systemic racism exists, but the term just describes the
condition obtaining when a social system is characterized by a dense
constellation of material disadvantages distributed according to
ascriptive racial categories. The roots of these disadvantages must be
identified and understood before any progress can be made in
addressing them individually, let alone depriving them of their
systemic prevalence. Furthermore, the roots of racial disparities
intertwine with the social structures of race, class, and gender in
logarithmically complex ways, complicating logarithmically the
political task of remediation.196 As critical Black studies scholar
192. See Charisse Burden-Stelly, Why Claudia Jones Will Always Be More Relevant than Ta-Nehisi
Coates, BLACK AGENDA REP. (Sept. 20, 2017), https://www.blackagendareport.com/why-claudia-joneswill-always-be-more-relevant-ta-nehisi-coates [https://perma.cc/A3MR-SDC9].
193. Radical,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER,
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/radical
[https://perma.cc/DXV7-BXXJ].
194. Robin D.G. Kelley, Black Study, Black Struggle, BOS. REV. (Mar. 7, 2016),
http://bostonreview.net/forum/robin-d-g-kelley-black-study-black-struggle
[https://perma.cc/76AR4UPF].
195. See Reed, supra note 19, at 268.
196. CEDRIC JOHNSON, REVOLUTIONARIES TO RACE LEADERS: BLACK POWER AND THE MAKING OF
AFRICAN AMERICAN POLITICS, at xxxix (2007); see also Lily Hu, Race, Policing, and the Limits of
Social Science, BOS. REV. (May 6, 2021), http://bostonreview.net/science-nature-race/lily-hu-racepolicing-and-limits-social-science (explaining how establishing causal inference in the context of social
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Charisse Burden-Stelly puts it, in American history “antiblackness is
inextricable from the suppression of labor, the deportation of ‘alien’
progressives, the incarceration of anti-capitalists, the indictment of
communists and ‘fellow travelers,’ the censure of demands for
fundamental redistribution, and the overall repression of the left.”197
In the face of this complexity, some political theorists, like Adolph
Reed, would prefer to jettison racial disparity discourse altogether in
an effort to foster cross-racial mass movement politics devoted to
emancipatory political–economic transformation and organized
around dinner table issues such as jobs, education, healthcare, and
housing.198 For Reed and his like-minded comrades,199 the danger is
that disparity discourse tends to elide the nuanced exploration of the
historical and political–economic context of race and racism,
focusing narrowly on the disparity itself. In the process, it frames
social justice in terms of equal distributions of goods and bads in
society, which in turn naturalizes the existing system of social
relations and neutralizes the possibilities for radical political
mobilization. Kelley recently captured this sentiment well, arguing
that people do not want equality of opportunity in a burning house;
they just want to build a new house.200 They desire a liberatory
egalitarianism, not a “brute egalitarianism” that “levels down.”201
So, for instance, a superficial political response to racial disparities
in homeownership in the first decade of the 2000s channeled housing
finance to Black households, a policy championed by the real estate
finance complex that cashed in on fees before the crash caused a
science generally, and racial disparities in particular, is complicated by the reality that “empirical
commitments are invariably entangled with normative ones, including commitments more typically
thought of as ethical or political”).
197. Burden-Stelly, supra note 192.
198. See Adolph Reed, Jr. & Merlin Chowkwanyun, Race, Class, Crisis: The Discourse of Racial
Disparity and Its Analytical Discontents, 48 SOCIALIST REG. 149, 167–69 (2012).
199. Here, I have Cedric Johnson, Barbara Fields, Karen Fields, Cornel West, and Lester Spence
especially in mind, notwithstanding the important differences among their own perspectives.
200. See Kelley, supra note 194.
201. See MARIE GOTTSCHALK, CAUGHT: THE PRISON STATE AND THE LOCKDOWN OF AMERICAN
POLITICS 6 (2015) (lamenting how punitive policies that initially targeted Black Americans are being
applied to other subordinated groups in the United States, such as immigrants and poor Whites).
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massive destruction of Black wealth.202 A radical approach, focused
on underlying causes and the broader political economy, would have
been able to avoid the instrumentalization of the disparity data by the
exploitative mortgage credit system and focus instead on the larger
picture of income stagnation, welfare retrenchment, housing debt,
and rampant financialization.203 The remedy for exclusion should not
be “predatory inclusion.”204 Episodes like this reveal the dangers that
attend superficial, potentially co-optative, uses of disparity discourse
from which a radical approach, attuned to the political economy of
race, needs to distinguish itself.205
Reed’s perspective is but one of many in a burgeoning “new
literature on race and class”206 that can breathe life into this new
politics. Whether one agrees with him or whether one sees overt
antiracist politics as mutually reinforcing with—and a necessary
complement to—an agonistic class politics challenging the
hegemonic neoliberal order,207 all of the authors contributing to this
burgeoning literature begin their analysis with a recognition of the
reciprocal interpenetration of race and class, and invite us to shift the
terms of the debates around racial disparities in a more radical
direction.208 They invite us to develop and disseminate what Angela
Davis calls a new “public vocabulary” that explores the relationships
between racial disparities and their historical and political–economic
contexts.209 The degree of diversity of perspectives on these issues
202. See MEHRSA BARADARAN, THE COLOR OF MONEY: BLACK BANKS AND THE RACIAL WEALTH
GAP 257–61 (2017).
203. See Reed & Chowkwanyun, supra note 198.
204. See KEEANGA-YAMAHTTA TAYLOR, RACE FOR PROFIT: HOW BANKS AND THE REAL ESTATE
INDUSTRY UNDERMINED BLACK HOMEOWNERSHIP 5 (2019).
205. See MILLS, BLACK RIGHTS/WHITE WRONGS, supra note 52, at 120.
206. DAVID ROEDIGER, RACE, CLASS, AND MARXISM 24 (2017).
207. Here, I have Michael Dawson, Keeanga-Yamahtta Taylor, Ruth Wilson Gilmore, Robin Kelley,
Asad Haider, Charisse Burden-Stelly, David Roediger, and Nancy Fraser especially in mind,
notwithstanding the important differences among their own perspectives.
208. See, e.g., NANCY FRASER & RAHEL JAEGGI, CAPITALISM: A CONVERSATION IN CRITICAL
THEORY 210 (Brian Milstein ed., 2018) (distinguishing the posture of “progressive moralism” from a
posture focused on the “fundamental structural bases of social oppression” that takes note of how racism
is “deeply imbricated with class (and gender) domination”).
209. ANGELA Y. DAVIS, THE MEANING OF FREEDOM AND OTHER DIFFICULT DIALOGUES 173–74
(2018).
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testifies to the importance of the theoretical terrain being disputed, as
well as the potential political energy bursting at its seams. The Black
Lives Matter movement in general,210 and last summer’s massive
nationwide protests in particular, should prompt us to think about the
connections between this theoretical work and what appears to be a
palpable political rupture, or at least a potential opening for one.211
A final note is in order regarding the feasibility of a reinvigorated
radical Black politics, as well as the concrete institutional payoff
from engaging in it. One might sensibly object that such a politics
will not, on its own, even come close to dislodging the doxic roots of
racial hierarchies and White supremacy, much less establishing a new
egalitarian hegemonic consensus against domination, subordination,
and exploitation.212 If this all sounds a little utopian, then it is striking
the right chord. Dawson, for example, expressly frames his call for a
new oppositional politics in terms of rediscovering the power of
utopian thinking to motivate vanguard Black politics.213
Erik Olin Wright’s notion of “real utopias” helps to concretize the
practice of utopian thinking.214 For Wright, real utopias are “utopian
ideals that are grounded in the real potentials of humanity, utopian
destinations that have accessible waystations, utopian designs of
institutions that can inform our practical tasks of navigating a world
of imperfect conditions for social change.”215 They are expressions of
the belief that pragmatic possibility is fixed, at least in part, by the
limits of our imagination. If nothing else, a reinvigorated Black
radical politics could advance real utopian thinking and enlarge the
horizon of the possible, a much-needed tonic to the resigned and
210. See supra text accompanying note 21.
211. See BOURDIEU, supra note 117, at 236 (discussing how transgressions of social frontiers, in
enacting the unthinkable, have radical, liberatory power, especially during moments of uncertainty and
crisis within the established order).
212. See KEEANGA-YAMAHTTA TAYLOR, FROM #BLACKLIVESMATTER TO BLACK LIBERATION 186
(2016).
213. See DAWSON supra note 24, at 175–210.
214. See ERIK OLIN WRIGHT, ENVISIONING REAL UTOPIAS 6 (2010).
215. Id. See generally RUTGER BREGMAN, UTOPIA FOR REALISTS (Elizabeth Manton trans., 2016)
(discussing the importance of rediscovering utopian thinking); RUSSELL JACOBY, THE END OF UTOPIA:
POLITICS AND CULTURE IN AN AGE OF APATHY (1999).
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melancholic mood of a presentist left politics that struggles to
imagine alternatives to the status quo.216 Examples abound of
vanguard movements shifting and shaping politics in moments of
crisis, including radical Black politics during Reconstruction.217 In
any event, it taxes credulity to imagine that sticking with the status
quo institutions and political arguments is less utopian and more
realistic than a radicalized Black politics if we are measuring success
against the end goal of reducing people’s precarity, vulnerability, and
disposability, particularly along racialized lines.218
Lastly, believing that disparity discourse is best deployed in an
oppositional, agonistic Black politics does not mean that the politics
takes place in a silo. Even if it does not primarily address itself to
White Americans—even if it does not conceive of its primary task as
one of convincing, eye-opening, implicit-debiasing, and the like—it
still operates in an irreducibly pluralistic political universe. If we
credit Mouffe’s account of agonistic pluralism, then all politics
becomes, at the most fundamental level, coalitional politics.219 And
to advance your group’s contribution to an agonistic pluralist politics,
your first task is to form your own coherent and focused group. The
reference to a coherent and focused group is not meant to endorse the
view that equates an ascriptive ethnic-racial identity with a natural
political constituency;220 to the contrary, the politics that is most
216. See Jon Bekken et al., Democracy and the Left, THE PLATYPUS AFFILIATED SOC’Y (Jun. 2019),
https://platypus1917.org/2019/06/01/democracy-and-the-left-4/
[https://perma.cc/R5B9-3PH2]
(transcribing panel remarks discussing utopia and melancholy in left politics today).
217. See, e.g., Eric Foner, Rights and the Constitution in Black Life During the Civil War and
Reconstruction, 74 J. AMER. HIST. 863, 868–69 (1987) (recounting how then-radical demands made by
influential vanguard Black thought leaders for suffrage for freedmen, equality before the law, school
desegregation, free public accommodation, and land reform influenced political discourse and achieved
concrete reform during Reconstruction).
218. See Smith & King, supra note 12, at 32.
219. See Olúfémi O. Táíwò, Being-in-the-Room Privilege: Elite Capture and Epistemic Deference,
THE PHILOSOPHER, https://www.thephilosopher1923.org/essay-taiwo [https://perma.cc/6RCE-DTZK];
Olúfémi O. Táíwò, Identity Politics and Elite Capture, BOS. REV. (May 7, 2020),
http://bostonreview.net/race/olufemi-o-taiwo-identity-politics-and-elite-capture [https://perma.cc/GHZ47RMB].
220. Cedric Johnson, The Panthers Can’t Save Us Now, CATALYST, https://catalystjournal.com/vol1/no1/panthers-cant-save-us-cedric-johnson
[https://perma.cc/7KMS-WVNS]
(criticizing the “specious view that effective politics should be built on the grounds of ethnic affinity
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interesting and promising draws on the ample Black radical tradition
that has always operated, with intermittent fits and starts, as an
“immanent critique of American claims to universality.”221 In belying
and demystifying the claims to universality of American institutions,
it makes an overture to the other pluralistic groups—including
immigrants, economically disadvantaged White Americans, and
religious minorities—that occupy space on the “chain of
equivalence” of subordinated social groups.222 It also bears emphasis
that the practice of exposing the arbitrariness of racialized hierarchies
should facilitate the forging of solidaristic bonds across these
marginalized groups. Indeed, it invites everyone to actively achieve
the solidarity on which a new egalitarian hegemonic bloc could be
built.223 Paradoxically, building solidarity through primarily
non-discursive political strategies in this manner might also build a
firmer lifeworld consensus that could serve as the foundation for
future discursive consensus concerning important political matters.224
The motif of a political vanguard coalescing around disadvantaged
social strata has informed radical social and political theory for at
least two generations,225 in specific articulations such as “new social

rather than discrete political interests”).
221. SINGH, supra note 17.
222. See supra note 179 and accompanying text (discussing Mouffe and Laclau’s idea of the “chain of
equivalence”).
223. See CHANDRA TALPADE MOHANTY, FEMINISM WITHOUT BORDERS: DECOLONIZING THEORY,
PRACTICING SOLIDARITY 7 (2003).
224. See supra Parts II, III (explaining current ineffectualness of discursively-framed politics
concerning racialized disparities in the United States).
225. Marcuse’s famous conclusion to One-Dimensional Man is one of the earliest expressions of this
idea:
However, underneath the conservative popular base is the substratum of the outcasts
and outsiders, the exploited and persecuted of other races and other colors, the
unemployed and the unemployable. They exist outside the democratic process; their
life is the most immediate and the most real need for ending intolerable conditions
and institutions. Thus their opposition is revolutionary even if their consciousness is
not. Their opposition hits the system from without and is therefore not deflected by
the system; it is an elementary force which violates the rules of the game and, in
doing so, reveals it as a rigged game. . . . The fact that they start refusing to play the
game may be the fact which marks the beginning of the end of a period.
HERBERT MARCUSE, ONE-DIMENSIONAL MAN 260–61 (2d ed. 1991) (1965).
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movements,”226 “emergent cultural practices,”227 and “the
multitude,”228 to name just a few. Perhaps the best illustration of the
generative openness of the radical Black politics pertinent to this
Essay is Richard Wright’s 1957 quip: “Isn’t it clear to you that the
American Negro is the only group in our nation that consistently and
passionately raises the question of freedom? The voice of the
American Negro is rapidly becoming the most representative voice of
America and of oppressed people anywhere in the world.”229
In closing, I want to return to Stuart Hall, who, as noted earlier,
argued that modern politics is the art of developing a set of common,
shared images that galvanize new hegemonic majorities, new social
blocs of always changing interest groups.230 The precise stock of
images that a reinvigorated radical Black politics might summon is
beyond the scope of this Essay, except that racial disparity data will
probably have a moderate, but not a decisive, role to play in its
development. I suspect that this new politics, conceiving of itself as
an agonistic project making demands and largely eschewing attempts
to change minds, offers a good, if not the best, chance to develop an
ideological imaginary up to the task of undermining the arbitrary
racialized disparities that pervade our present conjuncture.

226. CARL BOGGS, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND POLITICAL POWER: EMERGING FORMS OF RADICALISM
11–12 (1986); LACLAU & MOUFFE, supra note 168, at 76–77.
227. WILLIAMS, supra note 73, at 46–51.
228. See HARDT & NEGRI, MULTITUDE, supra note 129, at 99–107, 217.
229. RICHARD WRIGHT, The Literature of the Negro in the United States, in WHITE MAN, LISTEN!
(1964).
230. See supra text accompanying note 183.
IN THE WEST
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